Knowledge and Aquinas

interesting

2010-02-22T19:44:00.000-05:00

Reply to Objection 3. Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.

Article 10. Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

(II-II.47)

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76 is necessary in many ways - not only to clear of error - but also for the point that the soul is in the whole body (the last point) - after showing its fitting, etc. etc. also had to show that the soul has access to the whole experience of the body - is the experience of the body - otherwise there would be no sensing and reflexivity (the latter neither appetitively nor apprehensively).

KEY!!! I.76.1

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But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now anaction may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move oract, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part ofSocrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Question 75, Article 4), for this reason, that it is one and the sameman who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.

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looked up aquinas iudicium on ggl sch and started getting irrelevant about p. 11

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check out this site apart from the great article:

http://e-aquinas.net/pdf/deely.pdf

address of article i just downloaded

2009-11-20T19:58:00.002-05:00

http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_kr/v3nse/scs_a07.pdf

predication in aquinas i think its called

Sens

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Adler, M. J., «Sense Cognition: Aristotle versus Aquinas». The New Scholasticism 42 (1968) 578-591.

Adler, M. J., «The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense». (Holt-Rinehart-Winston, New York, 1970) XIII, 361 pp.

Aloysius, M., «The Epistemological Value of Sense-Intuition». Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 5 (1954) 71-88.

Aloysius, M., «The Ontological Value of Sense-Intuition». Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 6 (1955) 72-90.

Aloysius, M., «Toward a Thomistic Theory of Sensation». The Thomist 20 (1957) 143-157.

Alston, W. P., «A Sensible Metaphysical Realism». (The Aquinas Lecture, 2001: Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 2001) 65 pp.

Baertschi, B., «Sensus est quodammodo ipsa sensibilia. Le réalisme aristotélicien et le problème des erreurs des sens». Review Theology Philosophy 118 (1986) 237-253.

Bastit, M., «Sagesse et technique». Sensus Communis 5/2-3 (2004) 189-204.

Christianson, J. M., «Criterion of Truth: Being as Sensed». Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998) 353-398.

Cohen, S. M., «St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms». The Philosophical Review 91 (1982) 193-210.

(WAS THIS THE ONE THAT WAS THE ORIGINAL OR THE SECOND BEING RESPONDED TO?)

De Anna, G., «Aquinas on Sensible Forms and Semimaterialism». The Review of Metaphysics 54/1 (2000-2001) 43-63

Dewan, L., «St. Albert, the Sensibles, and Spiritual Being». J. A. Weisheipl (ed.), Albertus Magnus and the Sciences (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1980) 291-320.

Farges, A., «L'objectivité de la perception des sens externes et les théories modernes». (4. ed.: Études philosophiques pour vulgariser les théories d'Aristote et de s. Thomas et leur accord avec les sciences, 5: A. Roger et F. Chernoviz, Paris, 1898) 244 pp.

Haldane, J. J., «Aquinas on Sense-Perception». The Philosophical Review 2 (1983) 233-240.

Hess, M. W., «Language and Sense Perception». The Thomist 10 (1947) 56-74.

Hoffman, P., «St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being». The Philosophical Review 99/1 (1990) 73-92.

(I think this was in the thomist as well)

Kisska, A. J., «A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology». Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association80/2 (2007): «Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind».

Klubertanz, G. P., «The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition». The Modern Schoolman 18 (1941) 27-30.

Klubertanz, G. P., «De potentia 5, 8: Note on the Thomist Theory of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 27 (1949) 323-331.

Kmieck, G. A.; La Driere, M. L.; Zegers, R. T., «The Role of the Sensible Species in St. Thomas' Epistemology: A Comparison with Contemporary Perception Theory». International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1974) 455-474.

Lagerlund, H., «Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment». (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 5: Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) IX, 345 pp.

Laumakis, S. J., «The sensus communis Reconsidered». American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82/3 (2008) 429-443.

Ledvina, J. P., «A Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, with Special Reference to Vision, According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas». (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1941) XIII, 143 pp.

Lobkowicz, N., «Deduction of Sensibility: The Ontological Status of Sense-Knowledge in St. Thomas». International Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1963) 201-226.

MacDonald Jr., P. A., «Direct Realism and Aquinas's Account of Sensory Cognition». The Thomist 71/3 (2007) 343-378.

Mansion, A., «Le commentaire de saint Thomas sur le De sensu et sensato d'Aristote. Utilisation d'Alexandre d'Afrodise». A. Mansion; et alii (eds.),Mélanges Mandonnet. Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Âge, t. 1 (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 13: J. Vrin, Paris, 1930) 83-102.

Martin, C. F. J., «Self-Knowledge and Cognitive Ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-Thesis». H. Lagerlund (ed.), Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 5: Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) 93-108.

Morerod, C., «Le sens dans la relation de l'homme avec Dieu». Nova et Vetera (Fribourg [Suisse]) 79/3 (2004) 7-35.

Morerod, C., «The Senses in the Relationship of Man with God». Trans.: M. W. Levering. Nova et Vetera (Naples [Florida]) 5/4 (2007) 789-816.

Péghaire, J. L., «Forgotten Sense: The Cogitative According to St. Thomas Aquinas [1]». The Modern Schoolman 20 (1943) 123-140.

Plippen, D. W., «A Problem Concerning Relation in Sensation». Pontificia Accademia Romana di San Tommaso d'Aquino (ed.), Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario. Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 17-24 aprile 1974), t. 9: Il cosmo e la scienza (Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, Napoli, 1978) 307-314.

Ryan, E. J., «The Role of the sensus communis in the Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas». (Dissertatio doctoralis [St. Louis University]: Messenger Press, Carthegena [Ohio], 1951) X, 198 pp.

Sabelli, M. V., «The Affectivity of the Rational and the Sensitive Faculties of the Soul in Moral Experience: An Inquiry into the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas». (Dissertatio doctoralis: Pontificia Università Urbaniana. Facoltà di Filosofia, Roma, 2006) IX, 195 pp.

Schmidt, R. W., «The Unifying Sense: Which?». The New Scholasticism 57 (1983) 1-21.

Schneider, M. G., «The Dependence of St. Thomas' Psychology of Sensation upon His Physics». Franciscan Studies 22 (1962) 3-31.

Siggen, M., «L'expérience chez Aristote. Aux confins des connaissances sensible et intellectuelle en perspective aristotélicienne». (Peter Lang, Berne, 2005) 474 pp. [Cens.: Couillaud, B.: Cahiers de l'IPC 67 (2007) 133-145].

Simon, Y. R.; Péghaire, J. L., «The Philosophical Study of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 23 (1946) 111-119.

Tellkamp, J. A., «The sensibilia per accidens According to Thomas Aquinas». M. C. Pacheco; J. F. Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. Actes de XIème Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, Porto, 26 au 30 août 2002 organisé par la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, t. 3 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 11: Brepols, Turnhout, 2006) 1351-1362

Tweedale, M. M., «Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form». Philosophical Topics 20/2 (1992) 215-231.

Van Riet, G., «La théorie thomiste de la sensation externe». Revue Philosophique de Louvain 51 (1953) 374-408.

Wallace, W. A., «The Measurement and Definition of Sensible Qualities». The New Scholasticism 39 (1965) 1-25.

Wielockx, R., «Thomas d'Aquin, commentateur du De sensu». Scriptorium 41 (1987) 150-157.

Winance, E., «L'être et le sensible: Edmund Husserl et Thomas d'Aquin». Revue Thomiste 89 (1989) 357-404.

Winance, E., «Réflexions sur les degrés d'abstraction et les structures conceptuelles de base dans l'épistémologie de Thomas d'Aquin». Revue Thomiste91/4 (1991) 531-579.

Yrjönsuuri, M., «The Soul as an Entity: Dante, Aquinas, and Olivi». H. Lagerlund (ed.), Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 5: Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) 59-92.

Ysaac, W. L., «The Certitude of Providence in St. Thomas». The Modern Schoolman 38 (1961) 305-323.

Somme, L. T., «Passions et temporalité chez Thomas d'Aquin». Revue d'Éthique et de Théologie Morale 254 (2009) 51-61.

Sommers, M. C., «Manifestatio: The Historical Presencing of Being in Aquinas' Expositio super Job». Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 62 (1988) 147-156.

Sommers, M. C., «He spak to [T]hem that wolde lyve parfitly: Thomas Aquinas, the Wife of Bath, and the Two Senses of Religion». American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991) 145-156.

Sommers, M. C., «Thomas Aquinas' Polemic of Perfection». Pontificia Accademia Romana di San Tommaso d'Aquino (ed.), San Tommaso d'Aquino Doctor Humanitatis. Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico Internazionale (Roma, 1990), t. 5: Problemi teologici alla luce dell'Aquinate (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Città del Vaticano, 1991) 362-373.

Sabelli, M. V., «St. Thomas Aquinas on whether the Human Soul Can Have Passions». Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis; Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino (eds.), Atti del Congresso Internazionale su l'umanesimo cristiano nel III milennio: la prospettiva di Tommaso d'Aquino. 21-25 Settembre 2003. Proceedings of the International Congress on Christian Humanism in the Third Millenium: The Perspective of Thomas Aquinas: 21-25 September 2003, t. 1 (Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Vatican City, 2004) 667-674.

McAleer, G. J., «Jesuit Sensuality and Feminist Bodies». Modern Theology 18/3 (2002) 395-405.

gEN. iNTEREST

Drost, M. P., «Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions». International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991) 449-460.

Drost, M. P., «In the Realm of the Senses: St. Thomas Aquinas on Sensory Love, Desire, and Delight». The Thomist 59/1 (1995) 47-58.

Drilling, P., «The Psychological Analogy of the Trinity: Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan». Irish Theological Quarterly 71/3-4 (2006) 320-337.

Sommers, M. C., «Thomas Aquinas on the Family: A Necessary Prolegomenon». B. C. Bazán; E. Andújar; L. G. Sbrocchi (eds.), Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge. Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages. Actes du IXe Congrès international de Philosophie Médiévale, Ottawa, du 17 au 22 août 1992, t. 3 (Publications du Laboratoire de la Pensée Ancienne et Médiévale de l'Université d'Ottawa: Legas, New York - Ottawa - Toronto, 1995) 1592-1606.

Jud- and iud- in the thomistic bibligioraphy

2009-11-20T17:40:00.002-05:00

Also am checking up dream, sensa, sleep, somn in each one (excepting a)

Ashmore Jr., R. B., «The Analogical Notion of Judgment in St. Thomas Aquinas». (Dissertatio doctoralis: University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, 1966) 239 pp.

Barad, J. A., «Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity». The Thomist 55/3 (1991) 397-414.

Durbin, P. T., «Unity and Composition in Judgment». The Thomist 31 (1967) 83-120.

Eslick, L., «The Negative Judgment of Separation: A Reply to Father Burell». The Modern Schoolman 44 (1966) 35-46.

Fitzpatrick, F. J., «Aristotle, Aquinas, and Ryle: Thought Processes and Judgment». Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 31 (1986-1987) 197-227.

Gallagher, D. M., «Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas». Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76/3 (1994) 247-277.

I THINK THIS IS THE BOOK FR. DEWAN WAS REFERRING TO - YES!!

Garceau, B., «Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin». (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales (Université de Montreal), 20: Institut d'Études Médiévales - J. Vrin, Montréal - Paris, 1968) 286 pp.

Judge, B., «Thoughts, and Their Contents». American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983) 365-374

Knasas, J. F. X., «Esse as the Target of Judgment in Rahner and Aquinas». The Thomist 51 (1987) 222-245.

McCool, G. A., «History, Insight, and Judgment in Thomism». International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1987) 299-313

McNicholl, A. J., «On Judging». The Thomist 38 (1974): «Centenary of St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974», 768-825.

Owens, J., «Judgment and Truth in Aquinas». Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970) 138-158

Renard, H., «The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment». The New Scholasticism 23 (1949) 387-394.

Schultz, J. L., «Ought Judgments: A Descriptivist Analysis from a Thomistic Perspective». The New Scholasticism 61 (1987) 400-426.

Schultz-Aldrich, J. L., «Being as the Ground of Truth in Aquinas». The Heythrop Journal 50/4 (2009) 620-634.

Tyrrell, F. M., «The Role of Assent in Judgment: A Thomistic Study». (Dissertatio doctoralis: Philosophical Studies, 100: The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1948) XIII, 184 pp.

Tyrrell, F. M., «Concerning the Nature and Function of the Act of Judgment». The New Scholasticism 26 (1952).

Veatch, H. B., «St. Thomas and the Question How Are Synthetic Judgments a priori Possible?». The Modern Schoolman 42 (1965) 239-264.

SENSA

Aloysius, M., «Toward a Thomistic Theory of Sensation». The Thomist 20 (1957) 143-157.

Klubertanz, G. P., «De potentia 5, 8: Note on the Thomist Theory of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 27 (1949) 323-331.

Schneider, M. G., «The Dependence of St. Thomas' Psychology of Sensation upon His Physics». Franciscan Studies 22 (1962) 3-31.

Simon, Y. R.; Péghaire, J. L., «The Philosophical Study of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 23 (1946) 111-119.

Tweedale, M. M., «Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form». Philosophical Topics 20/2 (1992) 215-231.

Van Riet, G., «La théorie thomiste de la sensation externe». Revue Philosophique de Louvain 51 (1953) 374-408.

White, A. L., «The Picture Theory of the Phantasm». Tópicos 29 (2005): «Imaginación, sensación y pensamiento en los comentadores árabes y latinos de Aristóteles (siglos X-XIII)», 131-155.

Note on aquinas on dreams

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Dreams in the African literature [i.e. church]: the significance of dreams and visions among Zambian Baptists

Rodopi, 1999
ISBN	9042005963, 9789042005969 pp. 22-23 - Aquinas sided with rationalist school on dreams acc. to this guy - with ARistotle... hmm....

From Michael Stock -Thomistic analysis of concept of repression - dreams

2009-11-20T16:52:00.002-05:00

defined dreams as meantal activities taking place when consciousness of external reality is suspended in whole or in part.

did not think of dreams, however, as entierly meaningless meanderings of hte imagination. Noted that they often express symbolically the physcial conditions of the body b/c we can sometimes perceive these condtiions interiorly more acutely when we are asleep than when we are awake, and imaginatively represent them to ourselves, and "That is why doctors are interested int hem." Again, dreams might preprenst pscyh. tendenceis and dispositons of hte dreamer even in regard to matters of which he is not conscious when awake. MOreover, in teh dreams we dream, tehintellect might begin to work, judging and syllogizing, and sometimes better than in our wkaing hours! Dreams are not only aroused by the appetie,s but in turn will stir them up. The will itself responds w/ a natural response to the objects in the dream world, although, of course, its freedom is not exercised in dreams.

All this dream activity is likened, finally, to the mental activity of hte insane.

General list of references:

ST I.84.8 ad 2;

I-ii 17.9 ad 3; (acts of external members are commanded? - not exactly relevant)

80.2;

Ii-ii 95.6;

173. 2 and 3;

i cont. gent. c. 12;

iii cont. gent. c 99;

dv 12.3 ad 1 and ad 2;

28.3 ad 6 and 7).

I-II.80.2

I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains theintellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated (1; I, 111, 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which thedevil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetiteto some passion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the I, 110, 3, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spiritsor humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.

II-II.95.6

Article 6. Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

Objection 1. It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15-16): "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to make use ofdivination by dreams.

Objection 2. Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief baker (Genesis 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon (Daniel 2 and 4). Therefore divination bydreams is not unlawful.

Objection 3. Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose ofdivination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 18:10): "Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."

I answer that, As stated above (A2,6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inwardcause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any timethey concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper'simagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certainimages appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Numbers 12:6, "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I willspeak to him in a dream." Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear topersons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by arevelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 2. Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, or merely a new light?

Article 3. Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?

---

Contra gentiles:

i.12

APUT 12

De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur

[23571] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 1Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum.

[23572] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 2Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse.

[23573] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 3Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Via autem rationis perveniri non potest ut sciatur de Deo quid est. Unde nec ratione videtur posse demonstrari an Deus sit.

[23574] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 4Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum artem philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen; ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio, secundum philosophum, in IV Metaph.; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione.

[23575] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 5Item. Si demonstrationis principia a sensu cognitionis originem sumunt, ut in posterioribus ostenditur, ea quae omnem sensum et sensibilia excedunt, videntur indemonstrabilia esse. Huiusmodi autem est Deum esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile.

[23576] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 6Huius autem sententiae falsitas nobis ostenditur, tum ex demonstrationis arte, quae ex effectibus causas concludere docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex philosophorum studio, qui Deum esse demonstrare conati sunt. Tum etiam apostolica veritate asserente, Rom. 1-20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.

[23577] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 7Nec hoc debet movere, quod in Deo idem est essentia et esse, ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam hoc intelligitur de esse quo Deus in seipso subsistit, quod nobis quale sit ignotum est, sicut eius essentia. Non autem intelligitur de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum sub demonstratione cadit, dum ex rationibus demonstrativis mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare qua exprimat Deum esse.

[23578] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 8In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus.

[23579] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 9Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt.

THe next is long: i just paste the title:

CAPUT 99

Quod Deus potest operari praeter ordinem rebus inditum, producendo effectus absque causis proximis

Ahh this one is really interesting and finally positively saying something unique

[54384] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in cognitione duo est considerare: scilicet receptionem, et iudicium de receptis. Quantum igitur ad iudicium de receptis, potior est vigilantis cognitio quam dormientis; quia iudicium vigilantis est liberum, sed dormientis ligatum, ut dicitur in Lib. de somno et vigilia. Sed quantum ad receptionem, cognitio dormientis est potior, quia quiescentibus sensibus ab exterioribus motibus interiores impressiones magis percipiuntur, sive sint ex substantiis separatis, sive ex caelestibus corporibus. Unde sic potest intelligi quod dicitur Num. XXIII, 4, de Balaam: qui cadit, scilicet dormiendo, et sic aperiuntur oculi eius.

THIS IS EVEN MORE INTERESTING - very qualified - qulaifies judgment but also other stuff:

[54385] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 2Ad secundum dicendum, quod iudicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur, examinantur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, sicut de conclusionibus iudicamus eas in principia resolvendo. In somno igitur ligatis exterioribus sensibus, interiores vires quasi quietatae ab exteriorum sensuum tumultibus magis percipere possunt interiores impressiones factas in intellectu vel in imaginatione ex illustratione divina vel angelica, vel ex virtute caelestium corporum, aut etiam quorumcumque; sicut tenui phlegmate decurrente ad linguam videtur dormienti quod dulcia comedat. Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus; unde philosophus dicit in III caeli et mundi, quod complementum artis et naturae est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis iudicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethicorum, quod sensus est extremi sicut intellectus principiorum; extrema appellans illa in quae fit resolutio iudicantis. Quia igitur in somno ligati sunt sensus, non potest esse perfectum iudicium quin quantum ad aliquid homo decipiatur intendens rerum similitudinibus tamquam rebus ipsis; quamvis quandoque dormiens cognoscat de aliquibus quod non sunt res, sed similitudines rerum.

Phantasia appears at least 92x betw. 84 and 89

2009-11-16T20:22:00.000-05:00

Searching "judgment" and then searching "sens" in that - Thomistic Index

2009-11-16T19:32:00.002-05:00

CASE 4. PLACE 4. Summa Theologiae I, q. 17 a. 2 co. [...]^-10 Et inde est quod, propter corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum refertur ad alia.

CASE 5. PLACE 5. Summa Theologiae I, q. 17 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. [...]^-1

CASE 23. PLACE 17. Summa Theologiae I, q. 78 a. 4 ad 2. [...]^-1 Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionisiudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.

THIS IS NOT SENS JUDGMENT BUT IT IS RELEVANT

CASE 24. PLACE 18. Summa Theologiae I, q. 79 a. 8 co. [...]^-6 Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. [...]^-2

THIS IS NOT RELEVANT - From here onwards has to do with sensuality and relations w judgmnt

CASE 60. PLACE 37. Summa Theologiae I, q. 95 a. 2 co. [...]^-4 Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.

THIS IS RELEVANT HOWEVER
CASE 130. PLACE 89. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 45 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggrediendum periculum. [...]^-8

CASE 138. PLACE 93. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 48 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato; necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.Dictum est autem quod ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. [...]^-1

CASE 189. PLACE 126. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 77 a. 1 co. [...]^-7 Alio modo, ex parte obiecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. [...]^-2

CASE 190. PLACE 126. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 77 a. 1 co. [...]^-8 Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. [...]^-1

SEE whole of I-II 77 because there are more versions of it still

MORE COMPLEX - RELATED BUT I THINK "SENSE" Here is a derivative and more specific one derived/reltaed to common speech

CASE 386. PLACE 247. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 51 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod synesis importat iudicium rectum non quidem circa speculabilia, sed circa particularia operabilia, circa quae etiam est prudentia. Unde secundum synesim dicuntur in Graecoaliqui syneti, idest sensati, vel eusyneti, idest homines boni sensus, sicut e contrario qui carent hac virtute dicuntur asyneti,idest insensati. [...]^-5

SEE THE HWOLE OF II-II 51.3 because it is requoed several times.

aha it paid off!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! HERE IS THE GOODS

CASE 676. PLACE 415. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod vires sensitivae interiores magis vel minus opprimuntur a somno, propter vaporis turbulentiam vel puritatem, secundum hoc usus rationis magis vel minus impeditur in dormiendo. Semper tamen quantum ad aliquid impeditur, ut non possit omnino liberum iudicium habere,ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo non imputatur ei ad culpam quod tunc agit.

CASE 677. PLACE 416. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod apprehensio rationis non ita impeditur in somno sicut eius iudicium, quod perficitur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima principia cognitionis humanae. Et ideo nihil prohibet hominem secundum rationem apprehendere aliquid de novo in dormiendo, vel ex ipsis reliquiis praecedentium cogitationum et phantasmatibus oblatis, vel etiam ex revelatione divina, aut immissione Angeli boni vel ma

CASE 668. PLACE 412. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 151 a. 3 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temperantia non consistit principaliter circa delectationes tactus quantum ad iudicium sensus de tangibilibus, quod est eiusdem rationis in omnibus, sed quantum ad ipsum usum tangibilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Est autem alia ratio utendi cibis et potibus, et venereis. [...]^-1

READ WHOLE ARTICLE - here's four bits - note there's also sleep in ther...

CASE 671. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]^-2 Et hoc modo non habet rationem peccati. Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudicio rationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. [...]^-19

CASE 672. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]^-2 Et hoc modo non habet rationem peccati. Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudiciorationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. [...]^-19

CASE 673. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]^-3 Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudicio rationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudiciorationis, tollitur ratio peccati. In dormiendo autem ratio non habet liberum iudicium, nullus enim est dormiens qui non intendat aliquibus similitudinibus phantasmatum velut rebus ipsis, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. [...]^-18

CASE 674. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]^-4 Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. In dormiendo autem ratio non habet liberum iudicium, nullus enim est dormiens qui non intendat aliquibus similitudinibus phantasmatum velut rebus ipsis, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Et ideo id quod agit homo dormiens, qui non habet liberum iudicium rationis, non imputatur ei ad culpam, sicut nec illud quod agit furiosus aut amens. [...]^-17

CASE 715. PLACE 446. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 172 a. 1 ad 2. [...]^-1 Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa exteriora sensibilia, unde minus potest percipere subtiles impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum vel etiam causarum naturalium. Quantum tamen ad perfectionem iudicii, plus viget ratio in vigilando quam in dormiendo.

CASE 716. PLACE 447. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 173 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt.cognitio prophetica maxime ad mentem pertinet. Circa cognitionem autem humanae mentis duo oportet considerare, scilicet acceptionem, sive repraesentationem rerum; et iudicium de rebus praesentatis. Repraesentantur autem menti humanae res aliquae secundum aliquas species, et secundum naturae ordinem, primo oportet quod species praesententur sensui; secundo, imaginationi; tertio, intellectui possibili, qui immutatur a speciebus phantasmatum secundum illustrationem intellectus agentis. [...]^-16

CASE 720. PLACE 448. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 173 a. 3 co. [...]^-1 Manifestum est autem quod non fit abstractio a sensibus quando aliquid repraesentatur menti prophetae per species sensibiles, sive ad hoc specialiter formatas divinitus, sicut rubus ostensus Moysi, et Scriptura ostensa Danieli; sive etiam per alias causas productas, ita tamen quod secundum divinam providentiam ad aliquid prophetice significandum ordinetur, sicut per arcam Noe significabatur Ecclesia. Similiter etiam non est necesse ut fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus per hoc quod mens prophetae illustratur intelligibili lumine, aut formatur intelligibilibus speciebus, quia in nobis perfectum iudicium intellectus habetur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima nostrae cognitionis principia, ut in primo habitum est. Sed quando fit revelatio prophetica secundum formas imaginarias, necesse est fieri abstractionem a sensibus, ut talis apparitio phantasmatum non referatur ad ea quae exterius sentiuntur. [...]^-3
CASE 721. PLACE 449. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 173 a. 3 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod quando mens intenditur in suo actu circa absentia, quae sunt a sensibus remota, tunc propter vehementiam intentionis sequitur alienatio a sensibus. Sed quando mens intenditur in suo actu circa dispositionem vel iudicium sensibilium, non oportet quod a sensibus abstrahatur.

NOT SURE IF RELEVANT - getting tired:
CASE 837. PLACE 522. Summa Theologiae III, q. 77 a. 7 co. [...]^-2 Sed hoc non potest stare. Quia in hoc sacramento veritatis sensus non decipitur circa ea quorum iudicium ad ipsum pertinet, inter quae est fractio, per quam ex uno fiunt multa, quae quidem sunt sensibilia communia, ut patet in libro de anima. Unde alii dixerunt quod erat ibi vera fractio sine substantiaexistente. [...]^-7

THIS WAS THE MOST RELEVANT.
GO TO philosophynotes to get the De Veritate doctrine

lapidem

2009-11-16T19:18:00.002-05:00

CASE 3. PLACE 2. Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 a. 2 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae Deum repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit et nominat. [...]^-1

Reply to Objection 2. In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certainkind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

CASE 6. PLACE 3. Summa Theologiae I, q. 13 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. [...]^-6

CASE 10. PLACE 7. Summa Theologiae I, q. 59 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet nomen appetitivae partis sit sumptum ab appetendo ea quae non habentur, tamen appetitiva pars non solum ad haec se extendit, sed etiam ad multa alia. Sicut et nomen lapidis sumptum est a laesione pedis, cum tamen lapidi non hoc solum conveniat. Similiter irascibilis potentia denominatur ab ira; cum tamen in ea sint plures aliae passiones, ut spes et audacia et huiusmodi.

This is the one I was thinking of, I think... but the others are atcually more useful to what the subject matter is - since I am talking about the "work" of the knife.....

CASE 60. PLACE 47. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 92 a. 1 ad 2. [...]^-1 Etymologia attenditur secundum id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, nominis vero significatio attenditur secundum id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Quae quandoque diversa sunt, nomen enim lapidis imponitur a laesione pedis, non tamen hoc significat; alioquin ferrum, cum pedem laedat, lapis esset. Similiter etiam nomen superstitionis non oportet quod significet illud a quo nomen est impositum.

CASE 112. PLACE 91. De veritate, q. 4 a. 1 ad 8. [...]^-2 Et hoc est quod principaliter significatur per nomen. Sed quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum, ut VIII Metaph. dicitur; et secundum hoc nominamus rem; et sic illud quod loco differentiae essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen ex parte imponentis, sicut lapis imponitur ab effectu, qui est laedere pedem. Et hoc non oportet esse principaliter significatum per nomen, sed illud loco cuius hoc ponitur. [...]^-1

CASE 120. PLACE 99. De potentia, q. 9 a. 3 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine aliquo est duo considerare: scilicet, illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, et illud a quo imponitur ad significandum. Frequenter enim imponitur nomen aliquod ad significandum rem aliquam, ab aliquo accidente aut actu aut effectu illius rei; quae tamen non sunt principaliter significata per illud nomen, sed potius ipsa rei substantia, vel natura sicut hoc nomen lapis sumitur a laesione pedis, quam tamen non significat, sed potius corpus quoddam in quo tale accidens frequenter invenitur. Unde laesio pedis magis pertinet ad etymologiam huius nominis lapis, quam ad eius significationem. [...]^-3

Quando ergo illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, Deo non competit,- sed aliqua proprietas eius secundum similitudinem quamdam,- tunc illud nomen de Deo metaphorice dicitur: sicut Deus nominatur leo, non quia natura illius animalis Deo conveniat, sed propter fortitudinem quae in leone invenitur. [...]^-2

CASE 123. PLACE 101. De potentia, q. 10 a. 1 ad 10. Ad decimum dicendum quod, licet principium secundum rationem nominis a prioritate sumatur, non tamen imponitur ad significandum prioritatem sed originem; sicut etiam hoc nomen lapis non imponitur ad significandum laesionem pedis, licet ab hoc nomen sumi videatur. Licet ergo pater non sit prior filio, est tamen eius principium.

CASE 249. PLACE 190. Expositio Peryermeneias, lib. 1 l. 4 n. 9. [...]^-5 In hoc enim nomine quod est equiferus, haec pars ferus, per senihil significat sicut significat in hac oratione, quae est equus ferus. Cuius ratio est quod unum nomen imponitur ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur a laesione pedis, quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. Et inde est quod pars nominis compositi, quod imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non significat partem conceptionis compositae, a qua imponitur nomen ad significandum. [...]^-1

Commenting on 84.8

2009-11-16T18:58:00.002-05:00

ARTICULUS 8

[32003] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium intellectus non impediatur per ligamentum sensus. Superius enim non dependet ab inferiori. Sed iudicium intellectus est supra sensum. Ergo iudicium intellectus non impeditur per ligamentum sensus.

[32004] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2Praeterea, syllogizare est actus intellectus. In somno autem ligatur sensus, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig.; contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis dormiens syllogizat. Ergo non impeditur iudicium intellectus per ligamentum sensus.

[32005] Iª q. 84 a. 8 s. c.Sed contra est quod in dormiendo ea quae contra licitos mores contingunt, non imputantur ad peccatum; ut Augustinus in XII super Gen. ad Litt. dicit. Hoc autem non esset si homo in dormiendo liberum usum rationis et intellectus haberet. Ergo impeditur rationis usus per ligamentum sensus.

[32006] Iª q. 84 a. 8 co.Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. (source right here for ad 1) Iudicium autem perfectum (iudicium perfectum - is this a chance phrase or a technical one) de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum, faber enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut operetur hunc particularem cultellum; I find this relationship to be a very interesting one.... what does it say.... I am thinking that I shouldn't get blurred from the parallel with "factive" science - the end of which is the work, and the end of natural science which seems principally according to sense... i think? et similiter naturalis non quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes eorum quae videntur secundum sensum. stone and horse... but he says somewhere that "stone" is derived from "to hurt a foot" - which I think he says to demonstrate that we relate to the senses... or to the appetitive... not sure.... Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret, I think it is more a question not so much that we make everything to be "practical" but that its WORK or its opus or its operation in the case of every thing is essential to its being known - what corresponds to "opus" in higher things, or things that are not instrumental? only substances end up falling uponj I guess... being said most in one way. et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus. this is most interesting..... this has the status of a principle... I wonder what hte pattern of the articles is... it seems out we start so modestly... just showing X, and do we come around to an urgent case where sleep shows the dependency of our minds on sense that is not "solvitur" or "liberatur"? and what is it "liberated" from and what was it that became "solvitur"? and where can I find the positive statements in the Summa regarding these things?

[32007] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit tamen aliquo modo a sensu, it receives nevertheless some way from the sense, and its first and principal objects are founded in the senses.... (can do a lot of footnoting and relating to earlier articles here!!!) et eius obiecta prima et principalia in sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quod impediatur iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus.

[32008] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 2Ad secundum dicendum quod sensus ligatur in dormientibus propter evaporationes quasdam et fumositates resolutas, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig. Et ideo secundum dispositionem huiusmodi evaporationum, contingit esse ligamentum sensus maius vel minus. Quando enim multus fuerit motus vaporum, ligatur non solum sensus, am I dreaming or are these vapor issues connected with my studies on the history of melancholy? Might find some interesting things in there which must be only footnotes but helpful footnotes here.... sed etiam imaginatio, ita ut nulla appareant phantasmata; sicut praecipue accidit cum aliquis incipit dormire post multum cibum et potum. Si vero motus vaporum aliquantulum fuerit remissior, apparent phantasmata, sed distorta et inordinata; sicut accidit in febricitantibus (feverish). Si vero adhuc magis motus sedetur, apparent phantasmata ordinata (ordered); sicut maxime solet contingere in fine dormitionis, et in hominibus sobriis et habentibus fortem imaginationem(sober and strong imagination). Si autem motus vaporum fuerit modicus, non solum imaginatio remanet libera "imagination remains free", sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte solvitur "also common sense partly "solvitur"; ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt somnia esse, quasi diiudicans inter res et rerum similitudines. what kind of "real" awake activity does this correspond to? Sed tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus; et ideo, licet aliquas similitudines discernat a rebus discern some likenesses fro things, tamen semper in aliquibus decipitur but neverthless always decieved in some.really have to look at Michael's articles - the one where he says that true things can be thought of in dreaming - doesn't give exact quote but gives sources...... - go through his citations with a summa in hand. Sic igitur per modum quo sensus solvitur i am interested in this "solvitur" as well - and I do have good precedents for having studied that - althoughu sleep is something different from a strong passion - maybe there are some ways wehre they comet o common ground - e.g. stupor et imaginatio in dormiendo, liberatur imagination is "freed" and judgment of the intellect, nevertheless not totally (ex toto) et iudicium intellectus, non tamen ex toto. Unde illi qui dormiendo syllogizant, Syllogize when sleeping!!! cum excitantur, semper recognoscunt se in aliquo defecisse.

Sense judgment Aquinas (ggl schl)

2009-11-16T18:43:00.002-05:00

[BOOK] The judgment of sense: Renaissance naturalism and the rise of aesthetics

D Summers, 1990 - books.google.com
... 211 lnternal sense in Renaissance Neoplatonists, 215 Averroes, 216 Thomas Aquinas,
220 Benedetto Varchi on Michelangelo, 227 Benedetto Varchi on judgment, 230 ...
Cited by 65 - Related articles - All 2 versions

Aquinas on Sense-Perception

JJ Haldane - The Philosophical Review, 1983 - jstor.org
... be found between the stimulation of the sense organ and the final judgement about
those ... is mistaken is firstly, in denying that Aquinas sometimes supposes ...
Cited by 8 - Related articles - All 2 versions

Knowledge According to Aquinas

MC D'Arcy - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1927 - jstor.org
... TO AQUINAS. 189 existent reality, the mind has to combine with sense by a resolutio
in phantasmata. Sense, then, and reason are present in the judgment, and ...
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[CITATION] The problem of the internal senses in the fourteenth century

NH Steneck, 1970 - University of Wisconsin--Madison
Cited by 3 - Related articles

quinas on the Aesthetic Relevance of Tastes and Smells

D McQueen - BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS, 1993 - Br Soc Aesthetics
... extended to things themselves, whereas the judgment of hearing ... sight and touch than
by the other senses. ... Aristotle's Metaphysics, seems to be Aquinas's, and it ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - BL Direct

►Aquinas on the Immateriality of the Intellect,"

DR FOSTER - The Thomist, 1991 - thomist.org
... Thomas Aquinas, pp. ... 59Again, this is 'knowing' taken in a broad sense and not a claim ...
mental activities, eg, the frontal lobe with planning and judgment;61 the ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - Cached - All 3 versions

LEFT OFF P. 15

Sensus communis aquinas (ggl schl)

2009-11-16T18:34:00.003-05:00

Imagination, Prudence, and the Sensus Communis

PJ Gallacher - The Yearbook of Langland Studies, 1991 - Brepols Publishers
... Although Thomas does not use the term sensus communis as Albert does, the fact that
they ... brute animals that have the natural good of 7 Thus Aquinas: Dicit ergo ...
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Thomas Aquinas and Modern Psychology: A Reassessment

G Mora - Psychoanalytic Review, 1977 - PEP Web
... for the occasion of the seventh centenary of Thomas Aquinas' death ... The four internal
senses are sensus communis, imagination, estimative power or instinct, and ...
All 2 versions

(server down or something)

Can access - not sure about

[BOOK] Common sense: the foundations for social science

FL van Holthoon, DR Olson, 1987 - books.google.com
... 75 Conclusion 76 References 80 Part II: Common Sense in History 5. Sensus Communis
in the ... 96 6. Common Sense and Natural Law: From Thomas 99 Aquinas to Thomas ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 2 versions

AQUINAS ON PHANTASM

D FREDE - Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality …, 2001 - books.google.com
... That Aquinas stays fairly close to the Aristotelian model in his own ... as separate
capacities of the inner sense alongside the sensus communis, phantasia, and ...
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Aristotle on Common Sensibles and Incidental Perception

J Owens - The Phoenix, 1982 - jstor.org
... 7... non secundum accidens." Aquinas, In II De An., ed. AM Pirotta (Turin 1925)
197 ... London 1902) 96, n. 2. Again the reason was that the sensus communis in its ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[BOOK] Aristotle on the common sense

P Gregoric, 2007 - books.google.com
... The Aristotelian expression KOLVJ] aladrjais is translated, quite literally,
as sensus communis in Latin and as 'common sense' in English. ...
Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 6 versions

ilent harmony and hidden contemplation: Arguments for the congruence of philosophy and …

- ►usyd.edu.au [PDF]
G Richter, 2007 - ses.library.usyd.edu.au
... sensus communis. Let ... certain 19 KdU, A34. 20 see Closkey's discussion of
Aquinas on this point in Closkey, 1987, 75-79. Page 7. 18 ...
Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

[CITATION] The Inner Senses: A Medieval Theory of Cognitive Functioning in the Ventricles of the Brain

S Kemp - A Pictorial History of Psychology, 1997 - Edition Q
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[BOOK] Readings in epistemology: from Aquinas, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume …

VG Potter, 1993 - books.google.com
Page 1. READINGS IN EPISTEMOLOGY from Aquinas, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, Kant" by VINCENT G. POTTER Page 2. Page 3. ...
Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 2 versions

Left off end of p. 9 searching sensus communis aquinas in google scholar.

Beginning to write essay.

2009-11-03T18:25:00.003-05:00

The way I have it planned so far is to start with the context - appropriate setting in the Summa and then appropriate prologues.
Prologue of 75 (having cnsdrd sprtl and cprl - hmn being - spritla and corp sbstnc. 1 nature 2) production. Natr of hmn bng prtns to thlgn on part of the soul - not on prt of hte body unls. acc. to habt which body has to hte soul - versabitur.
3 things found in sprtl sbstncs - essnc, vrtu, oprtn.
1 - 2fold - soul's relation to the body.

Question 84 is the first moment in the Prima Pars where Aquinas begins to speak about the actions of the human being as a knower - the knowing activities. Following the order that X - it goes in order of essence, power, and operation. Leaving the will aside because X, Aquinas focuses on
OPERATIONS: We consider the will in the second part of this work, which deals with morals. Here we treat of the acts of the intellect. How the soul, when united to the body, understands corporeal things beneath it: Specifically, through what (84) does it know them? How (85) does it know them? What (86) does it know in them? When united to the body, how does the soul know itself (87)? When united to the body, how does it know immaterial substances (88) which are above it? And how does the soul understand when separated from the body (89)?
Our question here focuses specifically on question 84 (for what reasons?) through what (check the Latin) does the human being know corporeal things? This is a very fundamental epistemological question. THe human being must know X because of X.
Something that must strike immediately is the order of the human being's X.

Question 16 a. 4 ad's

2009-10-27T09:55:00.001-04:00

Reply to Objection 1. The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills theintellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in theorder of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2. A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that oftruth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.

Reply to Objection 3. The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (1). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.

2009-10-26T10:52:00.002-04:00

►Albert the GreatM Führer - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006 - plato.stanford.edu... own actions. This power, the liberum arbitrium, Albert believes is identifiedneither with the intellect nor the will. He holds ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions
Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite- ►jhu.edu [PDF] D Gallagher - Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1991 - muse.jhu.edu... cognition. Understandably enough, Thomas addresses himself to these issueswithin his discussions of liberum arbitrium. These terms ... Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 6 versions

The Scope of Deliberation: A Conflict in AquinasTH Irwin - The Review of Metaphysics, 1990 - jstor.orgPage 1. THE SCOPE OF DELIBERATION: A CONFLICT IN AQUINAS TH IRWIN I At hasoften been supposed that Aristotle's account of thought ... Cited by 2 - Related articles
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[PDF] ►Did Calvin Believe in Free Will?ANS Lane - Vooc Evangelica, 1981 - biblicalstudies.org.uk... Cf. G. Melles, Albertus Pighius en zijn strijd met Calvijn over het liberumarbitrium (Kampen, 1973), 17-53 for a summary of Pighius' case. ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML

The Recovery of Free Agency in the Theology of St. AugustineJ Wetzel - The Harvard Theological Review, 1987 - jstor.org... gratiam? Absit, sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus. ... possible. Liberumarbitrium seems generally to be reserved for describing the ... Cited by 5 - Related articles - All 3 versions
St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious CoercionPRL Brown - The Journal of Roman Studies, 1964 - jstor.orgPage 1. ST. AUGUSTINE'S ATTITUDE TO RELIGIOUS COERCION By PRL BROWN * Augustinehad to face the issue of religious coercion throughout his episcopate, and ... Cited by 22 - Related articles

[BOOK] The world as will and representationA Schopenhauer, 1966 - books.google.com... Schopenhauer uses the expression liberum arbitrium indifferentiae to convey themeaning of a will that is absolutely free in the meta- physical sense before it ... Cited by 360 - Related articles - All 4 versions
Kierkegaard and LeibnizR Grimsley - Journal of the History of Ideas, 1965 - jstor.org... trium is "nowhere to be found," Kierkegaard adds: "To let freedom begin asliberum arbitrium which is quite as free to choose the good ... Cited by 3 - Related articles
Melancthon's “Synergism.”FH Foster - Papers of the American Society of Church History, 2009 - Cambridge Univ Press... In Luther's favorite treatise, and elsewhere, he often makes the distinction betweenliberum arbitrium, the faculty of free will, which remains unchanged by ... Cited by 2 - Related articles

A LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF FUZZIBESS FOR THE APPLICATION TO HUMAN ACTIONSA ru Giuculescu - Fuzzy engineering toward human friendly systems, 1992 - books.google.com... ah (iiiJheterontmous and autotelic action hnat ha 2 (iv) heteron* mous and heterotelica* ti «n hnht h Ty^ eCi) is labeled" liberum arbitrium" and embodies a ... Cited by 3 - Related articles
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Free Will and Theodicy in Augustine: An Exposition and CritiqueF Berthold Jr - Religious Studies, 1981 - jstor.org... In addition to the general capacity of willing (voluntas) Augustine speaksof the free choice of the will (liberum arbitrium). This ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Freedom in MolinaG Smith, 1966 - Loyola University PressCited by 5 - Related articles
Augustine and medieval philosophyMWF Stone - The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 2001 - books.google.com... While both Augustine and Aristotle are conspicuous in the disputes over liberumarbitrium (freedom of decision), this being the main forum in which discussions ... Cited by 4 - Related articles - All 2 versions
[PDF] ►Descartes's CompatibilismV Chappell - Reason, Will and Sensation. Studies in Descartes's … - courses.umass.edu... Indeed at several places in his text, Descartes uses the expression 'free decision'(liberum arbitrium) as the name of the faculty of will (Med iv: AT VII 56 ... Cited by 15 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 6 versions

Aquinas on Being, Goodness, and Divine SimplicityE Stump - Miscellanea Mediaevalia Band 30: Die Logik des … - reference-global.com... places. It is also clear that for Aquinas liberum arbitrium is the powerfor choosing among alternative possibilities. In addition ... Cited by 1 - Related articles

[PDF] ►Anselm's account of freedomT Williams, S Visser - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2001 - shell.cas.usf.edu... Anselm uses libertas arbitrii and liberum arbitrium interchangeably. ... To say thatthey sinned per liberum arbitrium (through free choice), as Anselm does ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 3 versions

Letting Scotus speak for himselfMB Ingham - Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 2003 - Cambridge Univ Press... causandum actum volendi, ut sic breviter 'natura actu intelligens obiectum et libera'est causa velle et nolle; et in hoc consistit liberum arbitrium, sive in ... Cited by 2 - Related articles
Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: Implications of the Free-Will ControversyL Damrosch Jr - Journal of the History of Ideas, 1979 - jstor.org... Following Augustine, it was usual to speak of free choice rather than will, liberumarbitrium rather than voluntas, since the will of every fallen man is in ... Cited by 9 - Related articles - All 3 versions

European citizenship and the republican tradition- ►jhu.edu [PDF] D Jacobson, Z Kilic - The Good Society, 2003 - muse.jhu.edu... Public freedom was not "an inner realm into which men might escape at will fromthe pressures of the world, nor was it the liberum arbitrium which makes the ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - All 5 versions
[PDF] ►Castoriadis, Arendt, and the Problem of the NewLMG Zerilli - Constellations, 2002 - uchicago.edu... even those very few who believed in the liberum arbitrium have reduced it to a simple'choice' between two or several options, as though these options were ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 4 versions
Kant on Free Will and ArbitrarinessEV Cherkasova - Philosophy and Literature, 2004 - muse.jhu.edu... wanting, desire), svoevolie (arbitrariness) etc.—the Underground Man is referringto what medieval scholastics would call liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 3 versions

[CITATION] Liberum arbitrium and necessitas: a philosophical inquiry into Augustine's conception of the …E Rannikko, 1997 - Luther-Agricola-Society

[CITATION] Letter to dr. Chalmers on the liberum arbitrium, with additional remarks [by J. Johnstone?].J Johnstone, 1842
[CITATION] Human Action and Human Freedom: Four Theories of Liberum Arbitrium in the Early …CA McCluskey, 1997 - University of Iowa
[CITATION] … in relation to a settlement of the Church Question, on the footing of the Liberum Arbitrium …G Assembly - Hume Tracts, 1842 - null
[CITATION] Liberum arbitrium and necessitasE Rannikko - A philosophical inquiry into Augustine's concep
[CITATION] Clementia Liberum Arbitrium HabetM Bellincioni - Paideia, 1984

CITATION] ST. ANSELM AND THE WILL AS A POWERT Ekenberg - A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth, …, 2003 - Dept. of Philosophy, Uppsala University
Jena:" Akrasia and incontinentia: The Problem of Weakness of Will in the Philosophy of the …J Müller, M Perkams - Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 2004 - Brepols Publishers... pursues what appears to be advantageous (commodum), ie, what promotes his or herhap- piness, and such a person, while possessing liberum arbitrium, does not ...

Liberty of decision in the philosophy of St. Thomas AquinasP Bolberitz - Verbum, 2005 - akademiai.com... to ap- pear first in the terminology of the Stoical philosophy as a free act ofwill with individual characteristics (liberum arbitrium), thus contradicting to ... Related articles

[PDF] ►The rationalist of Aquino: Rescuing Aquinas from intellective determinismS Kristinsson - skemman.is... that “...the very fact that a human being is rational makes it necessary that ahuman being be characterized by free decision (liberum arbitrium).” (ST I ... View as HTML - All 8 versions

Intellect and Will in Augustine's Confessions- ►unl.edu [PDF] DD Crawford - Religious studies, 1988 - jstor.org... Augustine's conception of the will - whether it functions as liberum arbitrium,capable of choosing between presented alternatives, or simply as the execu? ... Related articles - All 5 versions

Calvin, Bernard and the Freedom of the WillV Brümmer - Religious Studies, 1994 - jstor.org... (i) Freedom from necessity This freedom is the liberum arbitrium or freedom of choiceby which ... Why is our liberum arbitrium impotent in regard to this task? ... BL Direct - All 2 versions
[PDF] ►Bruno Dumont and Akademeia: The Place Iustitia Dei, Auto-exousia and Our Experience of …T Clark, Q Montréal - nfn-audiovideo.ca... to interpret it as auto-exousia rather than as liberum arbitrium. Rabbi MosheBen Maimon, in his commentary on the Hebrew term “tzelem ... Related articles - View as HTML

Decline and Fall of Virtue EthicsKL Forhan - The Review of Politics, 1997 - jstor.org... For example, her discussion of liberum arbitrium, its standard translation, "freewill," and her preferred alternative, "free decision," is itself lucid and ...

[CITATION] Erasmus on Free Will: An Issue Revisited1M Hoffmann - Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook, 1990 - BRILL

2. WillR Kane - The Significance of Free Will, 1999 - ingentaconnect.comIngentaConnect. ...

Aquinas.JT Eberl - The Review of Metaphysics, 2004 - questia.com... of Aquinas's account of human freedom in which several misunderstandings are corrected,such as the meaning of Aquinas's term liberum arbitrium, and the ...

Habitus fidei: an essay on the history of a concept- ►kuleuven.be [PDF] M Wisse - Scottish Journal of Theology, 2003 - Cambridge Univ Press... etext/gc.htm, III, 156: 'Sciendum tamen est quod, cum etiam ille qui gratiam habet,petat a Deo ut perseveret in bono; sicut liberum arbitrium non sufficit ad ... BL Direct - All 5 versions

[DOC] ►Free will and the soft constraints of reasonCF Costa - RATIO-OXFORD-, 2006 - filosofia.cchla.ufrn.br... His judgment (liberum arbitrium) is impaired, and therefore his subsequent decisionsand actions, which permits us to say that in a full sense of the word ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 4 versions

Augustine's rejection of the free-will defence: an overview of the late Augustine's theodicyJ Couenhoven - Religious Studies, 2007 - Cambridge Univ Press... But with that caveat in mind, let us consider Augustine's late view of the liberumarbitrium (free choice) Adam and Eve had before the Fall. ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct

Baader: The Centrality of Original SinP Koslowski - Kierkegaard and his German contemporaries, 2007 - books.google.com... An intermediate term between sensuousness and free choice or liberum arbitrium ofgood and evil is needed, and that intermediate term is the concept of anxiety ... Cited by 1 - Related articles

The concept of will in early Latin philosophy- ►jhu.edu [PDF] NW Gilbert - Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1963 - muse.jhu.edu... the world. It is also significant that Lucretius does not speak of "freechoice" ("liberum arbitrium"). Cicero (106--43 BC). With ... Cited by 18 - Related articles - All 4 versions

Aquinas and Intellectual Determinism: The Test Case of Angelic SinT Hoffmann - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2007 - reference-global.com... Yet since the core problem of liberum arbi- trium – to explain how intellect ... thatevery creature endowed with the power of liberum arbitrium, including angels ... BL Direct - All 3 versions

8 Faith and the Kierkegaardian leapMJ Ferreira - The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 1998 - books.google.com... arbitrariness. But freedom, for Kierkegaard, never requires liberum arbitrium(freedom of indifference)(JP E 61-2; see also 74, 68). We ... Cited by 6 - Related articles

[BOOK] Henry of Ghent and the transformation of scholastic thought: studies in memory of Jos …G Guldentops, J Decorte, CG Steel, 2003 - books.google.com... that Henry's anthropology was developed in the context of a general polemic against'Aristotelian' or 'intellectualistic' theories of liberum arbitrium. ... Related articles - All 4 versions

Anselm's Definition of FreedomSG Kane - Religious Studies, 1973 - jstor.org... later writings, where they are generally, though not invariably, referred torespectively by the terms 'libertas' and 'liberum arbitrium'.2 Contrary to the ... Cited by 3 - Related articles

UP TO PAGE 20 of GGL SCHOLAR "liberum arbitrium"
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GGL SCHLR - ""appetitive aquinas"

Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite- ►jhu.edu [PDF] D Gallagher - Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1991 - muse.jhu.edu' For Thomas's understanding of nature and natural motion, seeJ. Weisheipl, "The Concept of Nature," in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. W. Carroll (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985), 1-23. For ... Cited by 10 - Related articles - All 6 versions
[BOOK] Aquinas on mindAJP Kenny, 1993 - books.google.com... vii Abbreviations viii 1 Why read Aquinas? \ 2 Mind and metaphysics 15 3 Perceptionand imagination 31 4 The nature of the intellect 41 5 Appetite and will 59 ... Cited by 46 - Related articles - All 3 versions
Aquinas on our Responsibility for our EmotionsCE Murphy - Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 2001 - Cambridge Univ Press... 27 Moreover, since volitions are for the most part just appetitive responses tothe ... It seems to me, in light of Aquinas's own carelessness about his categories ... Cited by 6 - Related articles
Virtue and Knowledge: Connatural Knowledge According to Thomas Aquinas.T Suto - The Review of Metaphysics, 2004 - questia.com... describing the effect of mutual indwelling in the apprehensive powers, Aquinascontinues describing the effect of mutual indwelling in the appetitive powers. ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 4 versions
Rationalized Passion and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation …E Uffenheimer-Lippens - The Review of Metaphysics, 2003 - questia.com... By the "passions of the soul" Thomas Aquinas understands all the movements of theappetitive power of the sensitive soul (46) including those with negative ... Cited by 4 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 2 versions

[BOOK] … knowledge & by love: charity and knowledge in the moral theology of St. Thomas AquinasMS Sherwin, 2005 - books.google.com... THOMAS AQUINAS M1CHA1'L S. SHI R\\'NOP Page 2. By Knowledge & By Love Page 3. ... THOMASAQUINAS THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS WASHINGTON, DC Page 5. ... Cited by 2 - Related articles

[CITATION] The threat of intellective determinismS Kristinsson
[PDF] ►The rationalist of Aquino: Rescuing Aquinas from intellective determinismS Kristinsson - skemman.is... The rational part of the soul, which Aquinas normally refers to as 'reason' (ratio),has two faculties, one cognitive and another appetitive. ... View as HTML - All 8 versions

►The Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the Originality of AquinasP Gondreau - THOMIST, 2007 - thomist.org... unique relationship between the lower sensitive appetite and the higher intellectualpowers, and the appetitive conflict accruing to it, Aquinas resorts to a ... View as HTML - BL Direct - All 2 versions
Aquinas on MindW read Aquinas - questia.com... Abbreviations, viii. 1 Why read Aquinas? 1. 2 Mind and metaphysics, 15. 3 Perceptionand imagination, 31. 4 The nature of the intellect, 41. 5 Appetite and will ...

►Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?DA Horner - THOMIST, 2006 - thomist.org... He suggests in this statement the possibility of an end-directed rational shapingof appetitive response. For Aquinas, an agent can rationally choose to shape ... Cached - BL Direct - All 3 versions

[PDF] ►The Integral Feminism of St. Thomas AquinasJ Hartel - GREGORIANUM-ROMA-, 1996 - laici.org... 16 JACQUES MARITAIN. "The Humanism of St. Thomas Aquinas". Twentieth CenturyPhilosophy. Ed. ... These powers are both apprehensive and appetitive. ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - BL Direct - All 2 versions

CITATION] Natural appetite and the will in Saint Thomas AquinasRW Graf, 1980 - Philosophy), Niagara University
[CITATION] Wanting Something for Someone: Aquinas on Complex Motions of AppetiteK White - REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS, 2007 - CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICABL Direct
[CITATION] The role of the sense appetite in man's actions according to St. Thomas Aquinas.C Phung, 1957 - Marquette University
[BOOK] Right practical reason: Aristotle, action, and prudence in AquinasD Westberg, 1994 - books.google.comPage 1. OXFORD Right Practical Reason Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in AquinasDaniel Westberg Page 2. OXFORD THEOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS ... Cited by 37 - Related articles - All 2 versions
[CITATION] Aquinas On The Cogitative Power And The Generation Of The Sense AppetiteR JANSEN - TRENSearch or browse through our database of over 6,800 theological theses/dissertations and conference papers. Select those titles you would like to order and add them to your shopping cart. When you are finished making ...
Aquinas, Virtue and Recent EpistemologyV AQUINAS - Journal article by Thomas S. Hibbs; The Review of …, 1999 - questia.com... a verbal difference, since we usually mean by curiosity an appetite for knowledgeexhibited in persistent questioning, while Augustine and Aquinas mean by that ...

Aquinas on Concord:" Concord Is a Union of Wills, Not of Opinions".DS Porzecanski - The Review of Metaphysics, 2003 - questia.com... There Aquinas argues that when the appetite or affection (affectus) fixes itselfon an object apprehended as good, the loved good impresses its form on the ... Related articles - BL Direct - All 2 versions
AN INVESTIGATION ON AQUINA'S VIEW POINT ABOUT WILL AND FREE WILLG MOQIMI - NAMEH-YE-MOFID, 2003 - sid.ir... soul's nature. Aquinas accepted Aristotle's idea about the appetitive poweras a distinct power of the soul. In this Philosophical ... Cached

[BOOK] … Effects of Immortality on Intelligence According to St. Thomas Aquinas, a Metaphysical StudyJC Linehan, 2003 - books.google.com... Thomas Aquinas, a Metaphysical Study James Colman Linehan ... It deals principally withthe thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the subject-matter under treatment. ... Related articles

Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas on the Emotions.C Leget - Theological Studies, 2003 - questia.com... Love, hate, fear, and all other human emotions can be found in both parts of theappetitive faculty, but Aquinas carefully keeps them distinguished. ... BL Direct - All 3 versions
[PDF] ►Person and Ethics in Thomas AquinasD Gallagher - Acta Philosophica, 1995 - comcast.net... At this point the primacy of the person in Aquinas' "moral universe" is ... Thus theabsolutely first appetitive motion in rational beings is amor atnicitiae, the ... Cited by 2 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 2 versions

Liberty of decision in the philosophy of St. Thomas AquinasP Bolberitz - Verbum, 2005 - akademiai.com... Thomas declares that will, as an appetitive power (potentia appetitiva) andfree will are not two powers, but one. . ... thomas aquinas 33 ... Related articles
… for Moral Philosophy in the Italian Renaissance: Thomas Aquinas and Jean Buridan on …DA Lines - Moral philosophy on the threshold of modernity, 2005 - Springer... by Eustratius, Michael of Ephesus, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of ... higherpart of the appetitive element ('in appetitu qui participat rationem'), a ... Related articles - All 2 versions

[CITATION] The nature of the practical intellect according to Saint Thomas AquinasJE Naus, 1959 - Università gregorianaCited by 3 - Related articles

Justice as Equitable Reciprocity: Aquinas UpdatedV Bourke - Am. J. Juris., 1982 - heinonlinebackup.com... Thomas into the cognitive and the appetitive. Both knowing and appetition are furtherbroken down by Aquinas into several lower functions directed to the ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[PDF] ►Thomas Aquinas and the Overlapping ConsensusD DiLeo - COMMMONWEALTH: A Journal of Political Science - house.state.pa.us... 7 passion, appetite, desire, pleasure and pain that we become what we are meantto be. 15 Aquinas even goes so far as to rebut explicitly Plato's claim that ... Related articles - View as HTML

[BOOK] Aquinas, ethics, and philosophy of religion: metaphysics and practiceTS Hibbs, 2007 - books.google.com... Page 2. Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion Page 3. ... ISBN 978-0-253-34881-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 12257-1274. 2. Ethics. ... Related articles - All 2 versions

[BOOK] Aquinas on the twofold human good: reason and human happiness in Aquinas's moral …DJM Bradley, 1997 - books.google.com... Operation of the Intellect VII-326 3. The Cognitive and Appetitive Sources of ... Virtue¥11I-387 6. Contemplation and Politics ¥11I-390 7. Aquinas on "Imperfect ... Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 2 versions

The Moral Significance of Pre-Rational Nature in Aquinas: A Reply to Jean Porter (and …M Rhonheimer - Am. J. Juris., 2003 - litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com... These acts are practical judgments, "constituting" what Aquinas calls "propositions",which because of their being embedded in the appetitive and volitional ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - BL Direct - All 3 versions

[PDF] ►The Psychology of Natural and Supernatural Knowledge according to St. Thomas AquinasT Riplinger - tobias-lib.ub.uni-tuebingen.de... ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Thomas Riplinger Tübingen 2003 Page 2. ii ... 1 THEPHENOMENOLOGY OF OGNITION A ORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS Thomas Riplinger Overview ... Related articles - View as HTML - All 3 versions

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[BOOK] The nature of the practical intellect according to st. Thomas AquinasJE Naus, 1959 - books.google.com... The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to Saint Thomas Aquinas by JohnE ... the practical intellect means con- formity of the intellect to right appetite. ... Cited by 5 - Related articles

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St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible FormsSM Cohen - The Philosophical Review, 1982 - jstor.org... visual sense images? Aquinas' discussion of appetite in ST, 80, Al containsan im- plied answer to this question. There he talks ... Cited by 13 - Related articles - All 2 versions

[BOOK] Living with God: Thomas Aquinas on the relation between life on earth and" life" after deathE Peters, C Leget, 1997 - books.google.comPage 1. LIVING WITH GOD Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and'Life' after Death CARLO LEGET \ THOMAS INSTITUUT UTRECHT - PEETERS LEUVEN ... Related articles

►Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human ActionC McCluskey - THOMIST, 2002 - thomist.org... What is true is that Aquinas would locate synchronic contingency not in the ... if thiscontingency is a function of cognitive capacities or appetitive ones, as ... Cached - BL Direct - All 3 versions
DID UP TO P. 25

88 and 89

2009-10-26T09:30:00.000-04:00

88.1 first concerns Averroes' opinion that "the greatest happiness" consists in somehow becoming one with the active intellect - and so it is interesting becuase it concerns the human good there. And when we come to 89 it is the same kind of thing - at least generally - insofar as 89.1 seems to be contending (even if it is not the main issue, at least in the background) with what is the good of the human being (intellectually speaking). And here's the body of hte argument
I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.
To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose.
In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples.

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but to talk about intellection in the human being as a goal in treating of it as a science is NOT the same as treating will - we're using the gaze of our mind based on what we want to look at an dbased on what is good - there is this complex thing going on... and this is what aquinas identifies at some point when he talks about how it is that truth and good or being and good are the same

still more figuring out - centring 87

2009-10-26T09:03:00.000-04:00

OPERATIONS: We consider the will in the second part of this work, which deals with morals. Here we treat of the acts of the intellect. How the soul, when united to the body, understands corporeal things beneath it: Specifically, through what (84) does it know them? How (85) does it know them? What (86) does it know in them? When united to the body, how does the soul know itself (87)? When united to the body, how does it know immaterial substances (88) which are above it? And how does the soul understand when separated from the body (89)?

Question 84. How the soul while united to the body understands corporeal things beneath it
Does the soul know bodies through the intellect?
Does it understand them through its essence, or through any species?
If through some species, are the species of all things intelligible naturally innate in the soul?
Are these species derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?
Does our soul see in the eternal ideas all that it understands?
Does it acquire intellectual knowledge from the senses?
Can the intellect, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
Is the judgment of the intellect hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?

Question 85. The mode and order of understanding
Does our intellect understand by abstracting the species from the phantasms?
Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
Does our intellect naturally first understand the more universal?
Can our intellect know many things at the same time?
Does our intellect understand by the process of composition and division?
Can the intellect err?
Can one intellect understand better than another?
Does our intellect understand the indivisible before the divisible?

Question 86. What our intellect knows in material things
Does it know singulars?
Does it know the infinite?
Does it know contingent things?
Does it know future things?

Question 87. How the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself
Does the soul know itself by its own essence?
Does it know its own habits?
How does the intellect know its own act?
How does it know the act of the will?

Question 88. How the human soul knows what is above itself
Can the human soul in the present state of life understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?
Can it arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?
Is God the first object of our knowledge?

Question 89. The knowledge of the separated soul
Can the soul separated from the body understand?
Does it understand separate substances?
Does it understand all natural things?
Does it understand individuals and singulars?
Do the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?
Can the soul use the habit of knowledge here acquired?
Does local distance impede the separated soul's knowledge?
Do souls separated from the body know what happens here?

THE WILL COMES BACK IN 87 art.4

Article 4. Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Objection 2. Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
Objection 3. Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will."
I answer that, As stated above (Question 59, Article 1), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)--that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.
Reply to Objection 2. The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above (82, 4, ad 1; 16, 4, ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will.
Reply to Objection 3. The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.

HERE ARE THE PREVIOUS ONES
Article 1. Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?
Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal."
Objection 2. Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.
Objection 3. Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above (Question 76, Article 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence.
On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.
I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.
Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as "act," but not as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible" [Possibilis--elsewhere in this translation rendered "passive"--Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above (Question 84, Article 7), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated (84, 5). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"--i.e. to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.
Reply to Objection 1. The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident.
Reply to Objection 2. The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things--as is the passive intellect--or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms--as is the active intellect.
Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are immaterial--as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply to Objection 2).
Article 2. Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves.
Objection 2. Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence.
Objection 3. Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves.
On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.
I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (1) that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (1).
Reply to Objection 1. Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes.
Reply to Objection 2. Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Question 84, Article 7), but as that by which it understands.
Reply to Objection 3. The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.
Article 3. Whether our intellect knows its own act?
Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible.
Objection 3. Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand."
I answer that, As stated above (1,2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Question 79, Article 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).
Reply to Objection 1. The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above (Question 84, Article 7), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.
Reply to Objection 2. The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Question 86, Article 2).
Reply to Objection 3. The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.