Article 10. Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?
(II-II.47)
Monday, February 22, 2010
interesting
Reply to Objection 3. Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
Saturday, November 21, 2009
76 is necessary in many ways - not only to clear of error - but also for the point that the soul is in the whole body (the last point) - after showing its fitting, etc. etc. also had to show that the soul has access to the whole experience of the body - is the experience of the body - otherwise there would be no sensing and reflexivity (the latter neither appetitively nor apprehensively).
KEY!!! I.76.1
But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now anaction may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move oract, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part ofSocrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Question 75, Article 4), for this reason, that it is one and the sameman who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.
Friday, November 20, 2009
address of article i just downloaded
http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_kr/v3nse/scs_a07.pdf
predication in aquinas i think its called
Sens
Adler, M. J., «Sense Cognition: Aristotle versus Aquinas». The New Scholasticism 42 (1968) 578-591.
Adler, M. J., «The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense». (Holt-Rinehart-Winston, New York, 1970) XIII, 361 pp.
Aloysius, M., «The Epistemological Value of Sense-Intuition». Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 5 (1954) 71-88.
Aloysius, M., «The Ontological Value of Sense-Intuition». Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 6 (1955) 72-90.
Aloysius, M., «Toward a Thomistic Theory of Sensation». The Thomist 20 (1957) 143-157.
Alston, W. P., «A Sensible Metaphysical Realism». (The Aquinas Lecture, 2001: Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 2001) 65 pp.
Baertschi, B., «Sensus est quodammodo ipsa sensibilia. Le réalisme aristotélicien et le problème des erreurs des sens». Review Theology Philosophy 118 (1986) 237-253.
Bastit, M., «Sagesse et technique». Sensus Communis 5/2-3 (2004) 189-204.
Christianson, J. M., «Criterion of Truth: Being as Sensed». Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (1998) 353-398.
Cohen, S. M., «St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms». The Philosophical Review 91 (1982) 193-210.
(WAS THIS THE ONE THAT WAS THE ORIGINAL OR THE SECOND BEING RESPONDED TO?)
De Anna, G., «Aquinas on Sensible Forms and Semimaterialism». The Review of Metaphysics 54/1 (2000-2001) 43-63
Dewan, L., «St. Albert, the Sensibles, and Spiritual Being». J. A. Weisheipl (ed.), Albertus Magnus and the Sciences (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1980) 291-320.
Farges, A., «L'objectivité de la perception des sens externes et les théories modernes». (4. ed.: Études philosophiques pour vulgariser les théories d'Aristote et de s. Thomas et leur accord avec les sciences, 5: A. Roger et F. Chernoviz, Paris, 1898) 244 pp.
Haldane, J. J., «Aquinas on Sense-Perception». The Philosophical Review 2 (1983) 233-240.
Hess, M. W., «Language and Sense Perception». The Thomist 10 (1947) 56-74.
Hoffman, P., «St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being». The Philosophical Review 99/1 (1990) 73-92.
(I think this was in the thomist as well)
Kisska, A. J., «A Look at Inner Sense in Aquinas: A Long-Neglected Faculty Psychology». Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association80/2 (2007): «Intelligence and the Philosophy of Mind».
Klubertanz, G. P., «The Internal Senses in the Process of Cognition». The Modern Schoolman 18 (1941) 27-30.
Klubertanz, G. P., «De potentia 5, 8: Note on the Thomist Theory of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 27 (1949) 323-331.
Kmieck, G. A.; La Driere, M. L.; Zegers, R. T., «The Role of the Sensible Species in St. Thomas' Epistemology: A Comparison with Contemporary Perception Theory». International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1974) 455-474.
Lagerlund, H., «Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment». (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 5: Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) IX, 345 pp.
Laumakis, S. J., «The sensus communis Reconsidered». American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82/3 (2008) 429-443.
Ledvina, J. P., «A Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, with Special Reference to Vision, According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas». (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1941) XIII, 143 pp.
Lobkowicz, N., «Deduction of Sensibility: The Ontological Status of Sense-Knowledge in St. Thomas». International Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1963) 201-226.
MacDonald Jr., P. A., «Direct Realism and Aquinas's Account of Sensory Cognition». The Thomist 71/3 (2007) 343-378.
Mansion, A., «Le commentaire de saint Thomas sur le De sensu et sensato d'Aristote. Utilisation d'Alexandre d'Afrodise». A. Mansion; et alii (eds.),Mélanges Mandonnet. Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Âge, t. 1 (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 13: J. Vrin, Paris, 1930) 83-102.
Martin, C. F. J., «Self-Knowledge and Cognitive Ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-Thesis». H. Lagerlund (ed.), Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 5: Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) 93-108.
Morerod, C., «Le sens dans la relation de l'homme avec Dieu». Nova et Vetera (Fribourg [Suisse]) 79/3 (2004) 7-35.
Morerod, C., «The Senses in the Relationship of Man with God». Trans.: M. W. Levering. Nova et Vetera (Naples [Florida]) 5/4 (2007) 789-816.
Péghaire, J. L., «Forgotten Sense: The Cogitative According to St. Thomas Aquinas [1]». The Modern Schoolman 20 (1943) 123-140.
Plippen, D. W., «A Problem Concerning Relation in Sensation». Pontificia Accademia Romana di San Tommaso d'Aquino (ed.), Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario. Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 17-24 aprile 1974), t. 9: Il cosmo e la scienza (Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, Napoli, 1978) 307-314.
Ryan, E. J., «The Role of the sensus communis in the Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas». (Dissertatio doctoralis [St. Louis University]: Messenger Press, Carthegena [Ohio], 1951) X, 198 pp.
Sabelli, M. V., «The Affectivity of the Rational and the Sensitive Faculties of the Soul in Moral Experience: An Inquiry into the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas». (Dissertatio doctoralis: Pontificia Università Urbaniana. Facoltà di Filosofia, Roma, 2006) IX, 195 pp.
Schmidt, R. W., «The Unifying Sense: Which?». The New Scholasticism 57 (1983) 1-21.
Schneider, M. G., «The Dependence of St. Thomas' Psychology of Sensation upon His Physics». Franciscan Studies 22 (1962) 3-31.
Siggen, M., «L'expérience chez Aristote. Aux confins des connaissances sensible et intellectuelle en perspective aristotélicienne». (Peter Lang, Berne, 2005) 474 pp. [Cens.: Couillaud, B.: Cahiers de l'IPC 67 (2007) 133-145].
Simon, Y. R.; Péghaire, J. L., «The Philosophical Study of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 23 (1946) 111-119.
Tellkamp, J. A., «The sensibilia per accidens According to Thomas Aquinas». M. C. Pacheco; J. F. Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. Actes de XIème Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, Porto, 26 au 30 août 2002 organisé par la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, t. 3 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 11: Brepols, Turnhout, 2006) 1351-1362
Tweedale, M. M., «Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form». Philosophical Topics 20/2 (1992) 215-231.
Van Riet, G., «La théorie thomiste de la sensation externe». Revue Philosophique de Louvain 51 (1953) 374-408.
Wallace, W. A., «The Measurement and Definition of Sensible Qualities». The New Scholasticism 39 (1965) 1-25.
Wielockx, R., «Thomas d'Aquin, commentateur du De sensu». Scriptorium 41 (1987) 150-157.
Winance, E., «L'être et le sensible: Edmund Husserl et Thomas d'Aquin». Revue Thomiste 89 (1989) 357-404.
Winance, E., «Réflexions sur les degrés d'abstraction et les structures conceptuelles de base dans l'épistémologie de Thomas d'Aquin». Revue Thomiste91/4 (1991) 531-579.
Yrjönsuuri, M., «The Soul as an Entity: Dante, Aquinas, and Olivi». H. Lagerlund (ed.), Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 5: Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) 59-92.
Ysaac, W. L., «The Certitude of Providence in St. Thomas». The Modern Schoolman 38 (1961) 305-323.
Somme, L. T., «Passions et temporalité chez Thomas d'Aquin». Revue d'Éthique et de Théologie Morale 254 (2009) 51-61.
Sommers, M. C., «Manifestatio: The Historical Presencing of Being in Aquinas' Expositio super Job». Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 62 (1988) 147-156.
Sommers, M. C., «He spak to [T]hem that wolde lyve parfitly: Thomas Aquinas, the Wife of Bath, and the Two Senses of Religion». American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991) 145-156.
Sommers, M. C., «Thomas Aquinas' Polemic of Perfection». Pontificia Accademia Romana di San Tommaso d'Aquino (ed.), San Tommaso d'Aquino Doctor Humanitatis. Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico Internazionale (Roma, 1990), t. 5: Problemi teologici alla luce dell'Aquinate (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Città del Vaticano, 1991) 362-373.
Sabelli, M. V., «St. Thomas Aquinas on whether the Human Soul Can Have Passions». Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis; Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino (eds.), Atti del Congresso Internazionale su l'umanesimo cristiano nel III milennio: la prospettiva di Tommaso d'Aquino. 21-25 Settembre 2003. Proceedings of the International Congress on Christian Humanism in the Third Millenium: The Perspective of Thomas Aquinas: 21-25 September 2003, t. 1 (Pontificia Academia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Vatican City, 2004) 667-674.
McAleer, G. J., «Jesuit Sensuality and Feminist Bodies». Modern Theology 18/3 (2002) 395-405.
gEN. iNTEREST
Drost, M. P., «Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions». International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991) 449-460.
Drost, M. P., «In the Realm of the Senses: St. Thomas Aquinas on Sensory Love, Desire, and Delight». The Thomist 59/1 (1995) 47-58.
Drilling, P., «The Psychological Analogy of the Trinity: Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan». Irish Theological Quarterly 71/3-4 (2006) 320-337.
Sommers, M. C., «Thomas Aquinas on the Family: A Necessary Prolegomenon». B. C. Bazán; E. Andújar; L. G. Sbrocchi (eds.), Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge. Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle Ages. Actes du IXe Congrès international de Philosophie Médiévale, Ottawa, du 17 au 22 août 1992, t. 3 (Publications du Laboratoire de la Pensée Ancienne et Médiévale de l'Université d'Ottawa: Legas, New York - Ottawa - Toronto, 1995) 1592-1606.
Jud- and iud- in the thomistic bibligioraphy
Also am checking up dream, sensa, sleep, somn in each one (excepting a)
Barad, J. A., «Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity». The Thomist 55/3 (1991) 397-414.
Durbin, P. T., «Unity and Composition in Judgment». The Thomist 31 (1967) 83-120.
Eslick, L., «The Negative Judgment of Separation: A Reply to Father Burell». The Modern Schoolman 44 (1966) 35-46.
Fitzpatrick, F. J., «Aristotle, Aquinas, and Ryle: Thought Processes and Judgment». Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 31 (1986-1987) 197-227.
Gallagher, D. M., «Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas». Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76/3 (1994) 247-277.
I THINK THIS IS THE BOOK FR. DEWAN WAS REFERRING TO - YES!!
Garceau, B., «Judicium: vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin». (Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales (Université de Montreal), 20: Institut d'Études Médiévales - J. Vrin, Montréal - Paris, 1968) 286 pp.
Judge, B., «Thoughts, and Their Contents». American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983) 365-374
Knasas, J. F. X., «Esse as the Target of Judgment in Rahner and Aquinas». The Thomist 51 (1987) 222-245.
McCool, G. A., «History, Insight, and Judgment in Thomism». International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1987) 299-313
McNicholl, A. J., «On Judging». The Thomist 38 (1974): «Centenary of St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974», 768-825.
Owens, J., «Judgment and Truth in Aquinas». Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970) 138-158
Renard, H., «The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment». The New Scholasticism 23 (1949) 387-394.
Schultz, J. L., «Ought Judgments: A Descriptivist Analysis from a Thomistic Perspective». The New Scholasticism 61 (1987) 400-426.
Schultz-Aldrich, J. L., «Being as the Ground of Truth in Aquinas». The Heythrop Journal 50/4 (2009) 620-634.
Tyrrell, F. M., «The Role of Assent in Judgment: A Thomistic Study». (Dissertatio doctoralis: Philosophical Studies, 100: The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1948) XIII, 184 pp.
Tyrrell, F. M., «Concerning the Nature and Function of the Act of Judgment». The New Scholasticism 26 (1952).
Veatch, H. B., «St. Thomas and the Question How Are Synthetic Judgments a priori Possible?». The Modern Schoolman 42 (1965) 239-264.
SENSA
Aloysius, M., «Toward a Thomistic Theory of Sensation». The Thomist 20 (1957) 143-157.
Ledvina, J. P., «A Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, with Special Reference to Vision, According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas». (The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1941) XIII, 143 pp.
Klubertanz, G. P., «De potentia 5, 8: Note on the Thomist Theory of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 27 (1949) 323-331.
Mansion, A., «Le commentaire de saint Thomas sur le De sensu et sensato d'Aristote. Utilisation d'Alexandre d'Afrodise». A. Mansion; et alii (eds.),Mélanges Mandonnet. Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du Moyen Âge, t. 1 (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 13: J. Vrin, Paris, 1930) 83-102.
Plippen, D. W., «A Problem Concerning Relation in Sensation». Pontificia Accademia Romana di San Tommaso d'Aquino (ed.), Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario. Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma-Napoli, 17-24 aprile 1974), t. 9: Il cosmo e la scienza (Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, Napoli, 1978) 307-314.
Schneider, M. G., «The Dependence of St. Thomas' Psychology of Sensation upon His Physics». Franciscan Studies 22 (1962) 3-31.
Simon, Y. R.; Péghaire, J. L., «The Philosophical Study of Sensation». The Modern Schoolman 23 (1946) 111-119.
Tweedale, M. M., «Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form». Philosophical Topics 20/2 (1992) 215-231.
Van Riet, G., «La théorie thomiste de la sensation externe». Revue Philosophique de Louvain 51 (1953) 374-408.
White, A. L., «The Picture Theory of the Phantasm». Tópicos 29 (2005): «Imaginación, sensación y pensamiento en los comentadores árabes y latinos de Aristóteles (siglos X-XIII)», 131-155.
Note on aquinas on dreams
Dreams in the African literature [i.e. church]: the significance of dreams and visions among Zambian Baptists
| Rodopi, 1999 | |
| ISBN | 9042005963, 9789042005969 pp. 22-23 - Aquinas sided with rationalist school on dreams acc. to this guy - with ARistotle... hmm.... |
From Michael Stock -Thomistic analysis of concept of repression - dreams
defined dreams as meantal activities taking place when consciousness of external reality is suspended in whole or in part.
did not think of dreams, however, as entierly meaningless meanderings of hte imagination. Noted that they often express symbolically the physcial conditions of the body b/c we can sometimes perceive these condtiions interiorly more acutely when we are asleep than when we are awake, and imaginatively represent them to ourselves, and "That is why doctors are interested int hem." Again, dreams might preprenst pscyh. tendenceis and dispositons of hte dreamer even in regard to matters of which he is not conscious when awake. MOreover, in teh dreams we dream, tehintellect might begin to work, judging and syllogizing, and sometimes better than in our wkaing hours! Dreams are not only aroused by the appetie,s but in turn will stir them up. The will itself responds w/ a natural response to the objects in the dream world, although, of course, its freedom is not exercised in dreams.
All this dream activity is likened, finally, to the mental activity of hte insane.
General list of references:
ST I.84.8 ad 2;
I-ii 17.9 ad 3; (acts of external members are commanded? - not exactly relevant)
80.2;
Ii-ii 95.6;
173. 2 and 3;
i cont. gent. c. 12;
iii cont. gent. c 99;
dv 12.3 ad 1 and ad 2;
28.3 ad 6 and 7).
I-II.80.2
I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains theintellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated (1; I, 111, 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which thedevil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetiteto some passion or other.
The reason of this is, that as stated in the I, 110, 3, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spiritsor humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.
In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.
II-II.95.6
Article 6. Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?
Objection 1. It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15-16): "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to make use ofdivination by dreams.
Objection 2. Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief baker (Genesis 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon (Daniel 2 and 4). Therefore divination bydreams is not unlawful.
Objection 3. Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose ofdivination, and it is lawful to listen to them.
On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 18:10): "Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."
I answer that, As stated above (A2,6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.
Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inwardcause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any timethey concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.
In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper'simagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certainimages appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Numbers 12:6, "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I willspeak to him in a dream." Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear topersons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.
Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by arevelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Article 2. Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, or merely a new light?
Article 3. Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?
---
Contra gentiles:
i.12
APUT 12
[23571] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 1Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum.
[23572] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 2Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse.
[23573] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 3Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Via autem rationis perveniri non potest ut sciatur de Deo quid est. Unde nec ratione videtur posse demonstrari an Deus sit.
[23574] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 4Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum artem philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen; ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio, secundum philosophum, in IV Metaph.; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione.
[23575] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 5Item. Si demonstrationis principia a sensu cognitionis originem sumunt, ut in posterioribus ostenditur, ea quae omnem sensum et sensibilia excedunt, videntur indemonstrabilia esse. Huiusmodi autem est Deum esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile.
[23576] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 6Huius autem sententiae falsitas nobis ostenditur, tum ex demonstrationis arte, quae ex effectibus causas concludere docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex philosophorum studio, qui Deum esse demonstrare conati sunt. Tum etiam apostolica veritate asserente, Rom. 1-20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.
[23577] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 7Nec hoc debet movere, quod in Deo idem est essentia et esse, ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam hoc intelligitur de esse quo Deus in seipso subsistit, quod nobis quale sit ignotum est, sicut eius essentia. Non autem intelligitur de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum sub demonstratione cadit, dum ex rationibus demonstrativis mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare qua exprimat Deum esse.
[23578] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 8In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus.
[23579] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 9Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt.
THe next is long: i just paste the title:
CAPUT 99
Ahh this one is really interesting and finally positively saying something unique
[54384] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in cognitione duo est considerare: scilicet receptionem, et iudicium de receptis. Quantum igitur ad iudicium de receptis, potior est vigilantis cognitio quam dormientis; quia iudicium vigilantis est liberum, sed dormientis ligatum, ut dicitur in Lib. de somno et vigilia. Sed quantum ad receptionem, cognitio dormientis est potior, quia quiescentibus sensibus ab exterioribus motibus interiores impressiones magis percipiuntur, sive sint ex substantiis separatis, sive ex caelestibus corporibus. Unde sic potest intelligi quod dicitur Num. XXIII, 4, de Balaam: qui cadit, scilicet dormiendo, et sic aperiuntur oculi eius.
THIS IS EVEN MORE INTERESTING - very qualified - qulaifies judgment but also other stuff:
[54385] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 2Ad secundum dicendum, quod iudicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur, examinantur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, sicut de conclusionibus iudicamus eas in principia resolvendo. In somno igitur ligatis exterioribus sensibus, interiores vires quasi quietatae ab exteriorum sensuum tumultibus magis percipere possunt interiores impressiones factas in intellectu vel in imaginatione ex illustratione divina vel angelica, vel ex virtute caelestium corporum, aut etiam quorumcumque; sicut tenui phlegmate decurrente ad linguam videtur dormienti quod dulcia comedat. Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus; unde philosophus dicit in III caeli et mundi, quod complementum artis et naturae est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis iudicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethicorum, quod sensus est extremi sicut intellectus principiorum; extrema appellans illa in quae fit resolutio iudicantis. Quia igitur in somno ligati sunt sensus, non potest esse perfectum iudicium quin quantum ad aliquid homo decipiatur intendens rerum similitudinibus tamquam rebus ipsis; quamvis quandoque dormiens cognoscat de aliquibus quod non sunt res, sed similitudines rerum.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Searching "judgment" and then searching "sens" in that - Thomistic Index
CASE 4. PLACE 4. Summa Theologiae I, q. 17 a. 2 co. [...]-10 Et inde est quod, propter corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum refertur ad alia.
CASE 5. PLACE 5. Summa Theologiae I, q. 17 a. 2 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. [...]-1
CASE 23. PLACE 17. Summa Theologiae I, q. 78 a. 4 ad 2. [...]-1 Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionisiudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.
THIS IS NOT SENS JUDGMENT BUT IT IS RELEVANT
CASE 24. PLACE 18. Summa Theologiae I, q. 79 a. 8 co. [...]-6 Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. [...]-2
THIS IS NOT RELEVANT - From here onwards has to do with sensuality and relations w judgmnt
CASE 60. PLACE 37. Summa Theologiae I, q. 95 a. 2 co. [...]-4 Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.
THIS IS RELEVANT HOWEVER
CASE 130. PLACE 89. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 45 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggrediendum periculum. [...]-8
CASE 138. PLACE 93. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 48 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu; tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato; necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.Dictum est autem quod ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam usque ad exteriora membra derivetur. [...]-1
CASE 189. PLACE 126. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 77 a. 1 co. [...]-7 Alio modo, ex parte obiecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. [...]-2
CASE 190. PLACE 126. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 77 a. 1 co. [...]-8 Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. [...]-1
SEE whole of I-II 77 because there are more versions of it still
MORE COMPLEX - RELATED BUT I THINK "SENSE" Here is a derivative and more specific one derived/reltaed to common speech
CASE 386. PLACE 247. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 51 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod synesis importat iudicium rectum non quidem circa speculabilia, sed circa particularia operabilia, circa quae etiam est prudentia. Unde secundum synesim dicuntur in Graecoaliqui syneti, idest sensati, vel eusyneti, idest homines boni sensus, sicut e contrario qui carent hac virtute dicuntur asyneti,idest insensati. [...]-5
SEE THE HWOLE OF II-II 51.3 because it is requoed several times.
aha it paid off!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! HERE IS THE GOODS
CASE 676. PLACE 415. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod vires sensitivae interiores magis vel minus opprimuntur a somno, propter vaporis turbulentiam vel puritatem, secundum hoc usus rationis magis vel minus impeditur in dormiendo. Semper tamen quantum ad aliquid impeditur, ut non possit omnino liberum iudicium habere,ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo non imputatur ei ad culpam quod tunc agit.
CASE 677. PLACE 416. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod apprehensio rationis non ita impeditur in somno sicut eius iudicium, quod perficitur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima principia cognitionis humanae. Et ideo nihil prohibet hominem secundum rationem apprehendere aliquid de novo in dormiendo, vel ex ipsis reliquiis praecedentium cogitationum et phantasmatibus oblatis, vel etiam ex revelatione divina, aut immissione Angeli boni vel ma
CASE 668. PLACE 412. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 151 a. 3 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temperantia non consistit principaliter circa delectationes tactus quantum ad iudicium sensus de tangibilibus, quod est eiusdem rationis in omnibus, sed quantum ad ipsum usum tangibilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Est autem alia ratio utendi cibis et potibus, et venereis. [...]-1
READ WHOLE ARTICLE - here's four bits - note there's also sleep in ther...
CASE 671. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]-2 Et hoc modo non habet rationem peccati. Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudicio rationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. [...]-19
CASE 672. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]-2 Et hoc modo non habet rationem peccati. Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudiciorationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. [...]-19
CASE 673. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]-3 Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudicio rationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudiciorationis, tollitur ratio peccati. In dormiendo autem ratio non habet liberum iudicium, nullus enim est dormiens qui non intendat aliquibus similitudinibus phantasmatum velut rebus ipsis, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. [...]-18
CASE 674. PLACE 414. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 154 a. 5 co. [...]-4 Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. In dormiendo autem ratio non habet liberum iudicium, nullus enim est dormiens qui non intendat aliquibus similitudinibus phantasmatum velut rebus ipsis, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Et ideo id quod agit homo dormiens, qui non habet liberum iudicium rationis, non imputatur ei ad culpam, sicut nec illud quod agit furiosus aut amens. [...]-17
CASE 715. PLACE 446. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 172 a. 1 ad 2. [...]-1 Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa exteriora sensibilia, unde minus potest percipere subtiles impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum vel etiam causarum naturalium. Quantum tamen ad perfectionem iudicii, plus viget ratio in vigilando quam in dormiendo.
CASE 716. PLACE 447. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 173 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt.cognitio prophetica maxime ad mentem pertinet. Circa cognitionem autem humanae mentis duo oportet considerare, scilicet acceptionem, sive repraesentationem rerum; et iudicium de rebus praesentatis. Repraesentantur autem menti humanae res aliquae secundum aliquas species, et secundum naturae ordinem, primo oportet quod species praesententur sensui; secundo, imaginationi; tertio, intellectui possibili, qui immutatur a speciebus phantasmatum secundum illustrationem intellectus agentis. [...]-16
CASE 720. PLACE 448. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 173 a. 3 co. [...]-1 Manifestum est autem quod non fit abstractio a sensibus quando aliquid repraesentatur menti prophetae per species sensibiles, sive ad hoc specialiter formatas divinitus, sicut rubus ostensus Moysi, et Scriptura ostensa Danieli; sive etiam per alias causas productas, ita tamen quod secundum divinam providentiam ad aliquid prophetice significandum ordinetur, sicut per arcam Noe significabatur Ecclesia. Similiter etiam non est necesse ut fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus per hoc quod mens prophetae illustratur intelligibili lumine, aut formatur intelligibilibus speciebus, quia in nobis perfectum iudicium intellectus habetur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima nostrae cognitionis principia, ut in primo habitum est. Sed quando fit revelatio prophetica secundum formas imaginarias, necesse est fieri abstractionem a sensibus, ut talis apparitio phantasmatum non referatur ad ea quae exterius sentiuntur. [...]-3
CASE 721. PLACE 449. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 173 a. 3 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod quando mens intenditur in suo actu circa absentia, quae sunt a sensibus remota, tunc propter vehementiam intentionis sequitur alienatio a sensibus. Sed quando mens intenditur in suo actu circa dispositionem vel iudicium sensibilium, non oportet quod a sensibus abstrahatur.
NOT SURE IF RELEVANT - getting tired:
CASE 837. PLACE 522. Summa Theologiae III, q. 77 a. 7 co. [...]-2 Sed hoc non potest stare. Quia in hoc sacramento veritatis sensus non decipitur circa ea quorum iudicium ad ipsum pertinet, inter quae est fractio, per quam ex uno fiunt multa, quae quidem sunt sensibilia communia, ut patet in libro de anima. Unde alii dixerunt quod erat ibi vera fractio sine substantiaexistente. [...]-7
THIS WAS THE MOST RELEVANT.
GO TO philosophynotes to get the De Veritate doctrine
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