From Michael Stock -Thomistic analysis of concept of repression - dreams

defined dreams as meantal activities taking place when consciousness of external reality is suspended in whole or in part.

did not think of dreams, however, as entierly meaningless meanderings of hte imagination. Noted that they often express symbolically the physcial conditions of the body b/c we can sometimes perceive these condtiions interiorly more acutely when we are asleep than when we are awake, and imaginatively represent them to ourselves, and "That is why doctors are interested int hem." Again, dreams might preprenst pscyh. tendenceis and dispositons of hte dreamer even in regard to matters of which he is not conscious when awake. MOreover, in teh dreams we dream, tehintellect might begin to work, judging and syllogizing, and sometimes better than in our wkaing hours! Dreams are not only aroused by the appetie,s but in turn will stir them up. The will itself responds w/ a natural response to the objects in the dream world, although, of course, its freedom is not exercised in dreams.

All this dream activity is likened, finally, to the mental activity of hte insane.

General list of references:

ST I.84.8 ad 2;

I-ii 17.9 ad 3; (acts of external members are commanded? - not exactly relevant)

80.2;

Ii-ii 95.6;

173. 2 and 3;

i cont. gent. c. 12;

iii cont. gent. c 99;

dv 12.3 ad 1 and ad 2;

28.3 ad 6 and 7).

I-II.80.2

I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains theintellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated (1; I, 111, 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which thedevil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetiteto some passion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the I, 110, 3, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spiritsor humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.

II-II.95.6

Article 6. Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

Objection 1. It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15-16): "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to make use ofdivination by dreams.

Objection 2. Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief baker (Genesis 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon (Daniel 2 and 4). Therefore divination bydreams is not unlawful.

Objection 3. Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose ofdivination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 18:10): "Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."

I answer that, As stated above (A2,6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inwardcause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any timethey concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper'simagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certainimages appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Numbers 12:6, "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I willspeak to him in a dream." Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear topersons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by arevelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Article 2. Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, or merely a new light?

Article 3. Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?

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Contra gentiles:

i.12

APUT 12

De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur

[23571] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 1Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum.

[23572] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 2Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse.

[23573] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 3Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Via autem rationis perveniri non potest ut sciatur de Deo quid est. Unde nec ratione videtur posse demonstrari an Deus sit.

[23574] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 4Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum artem philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen; ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio, secundum philosophum, in IV Metaph.; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione.

[23575] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 5Item. Si demonstrationis principia a sensu cognitionis originem sumunt, ut in posterioribus ostenditur, ea quae omnem sensum et sensibilia excedunt, videntur indemonstrabilia esse. Huiusmodi autem est Deum esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile.

[23576] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 6Huius autem sententiae falsitas nobis ostenditur, tum ex demonstrationis arte, quae ex effectibus causas concludere docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex philosophorum studio, qui Deum esse demonstrare conati sunt. Tum etiam apostolica veritate asserente, Rom. 1-20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.

[23577] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 7Nec hoc debet movere, quod in Deo idem est essentia et esse, ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam hoc intelligitur de esse quo Deus in seipso subsistit, quod nobis quale sit ignotum est, sicut eius essentia. Non autem intelligitur de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum sub demonstratione cadit, dum ex rationibus demonstrativis mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare qua exprimat Deum esse.

[23578] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 8In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus.

[23579] Contra Gentiles, lib. 1 cap. 12 n. 9Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt.

THe next is long: i just paste the title:

CAPUT 99

Quod Deus potest operari praeter ordinem rebus inditum, producendo effectus absque causis proximis

Ahh this one is really interesting and finally positively saying something unique

[54384] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 1Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in cognitione duo est considerare: scilicet receptionem, et iudicium de receptis. Quantum igitur ad iudicium de receptis, potior est vigilantis cognitio quam dormientis; quia iudicium vigilantis est liberum, sed dormientis ligatum, ut dicitur in Lib. de somno et vigilia. Sed quantum ad receptionem, cognitio dormientis est potior, quia quiescentibus sensibus ab exterioribus motibus interiores impressiones magis percipiuntur, sive sint ex substantiis separatis, sive ex caelestibus corporibus. Unde sic potest intelligi quod dicitur Num. XXIII, 4, de Balaam: qui cadit, scilicet dormiendo, et sic aperiuntur oculi eius.

THIS IS EVEN MORE INTERESTING - very qualified - qulaifies judgment but also other stuff:

[54385] De veritate, q. 12 a. 3 ad 2Ad secundum dicendum, quod iudicium non dependet tantum a receptione speciei, sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur, examinantur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, sicut de conclusionibus iudicamus eas in principia resolvendo. In somno igitur ligatis exterioribus sensibus, interiores vires quasi quietatae ab exteriorum sensuum tumultibus magis percipere possunt interiores impressiones factas in intellectu vel in imaginatione ex illustratione divina vel angelica, vel ex virtute caelestium corporum, aut etiam quorumcumque; sicut tenui phlegmate decurrente ad linguam videtur dormienti quod dulcia comedat. Sed quia primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus; unde philosophus dicit in III caeli et mundi, quod complementum artis et naturae est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua debemus de aliis iudicare; et similiter dicit in VI Ethicorum, quod sensus est extremi sicut intellectus principiorum; extrema appellans illa in quae fit resolutio iudicantis. Quia igitur in somno ligati sunt sensus, non potest esse perfectum iudicium quin quantum ad aliquid homo decipiatur intendens rerum similitudinibus tamquam rebus ipsis; quamvis quandoque dormiens cognoscat de aliquibus quod non sunt res, sed similitudines rerum.