POWER: The powers of the soul in general (77) Those powers which are a preamble to the intellect (78). The intellectual (79) powers. The appetitive powers in general (80), and specifically: sensuality (81), the will (82) and free-will (83).
OPERATIONS: We consider the will in the second part of this work, which deals with morals. Here we treat of the acts of the intellect. How the soul, when united to the body, understands corporeal things beneath it: Specifically, through what (84) does it know them? How (85) does it know them? What (86) does it know in them? When united to the body, how does the soul know itself (87)? When united to the body, how does it know immaterial substances (88) which are above it? And how does the soul understand when separated from the body (89)?
Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since theconcupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [De Animal. Histor. viii.].
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite isnaturally moved by the estimative power; (HERE'S WHERE THE PREAMBLES MAKE SENSE AS WELL!!!! - i think the cogitative is in the preamble anyway...)for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Question 78, Article 4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reasonrather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite.
SO THERE IS INFLUENCE UPON THE PASSIONS NOT ONLY BY REASON BUT ALSO BY WILL.... which is something that ppl don't talk about - or if they do - why don't they talk about reason and will together - the influence of sharing the same kind of iindividual for which each was made 0 no bad way of putting it - all preparing - made for the kind of actions and passions that the human being can have.
Question 83. Free-will
1. does man have free will (another way of saying it, what is the definition of free as defined by the human being's capacity.)
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf,judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judgesthat something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. (A RESULT OF THE PROOF WHICH IS THE ACT OF COMPARISON - being free is only being able to compare - he doesn't hinge a whole lot on this!!!! AND LOOK AT THE FOLLOWING INDICATIONS - WE CAN SEE FROM DIALECITC AND RHETORICAL THAT REASON CAN TAKE DIFFERENT COURSES) For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
83. 2 Is liberium arbitrium a power?
I answer that, Although free-will [Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (82, 1,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.
Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions andpassions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and byknowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will isindifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.
HOW HE GETS TO FREE JUDGMENT BEING AN APPETITIVE -
83.3 whether free-will is an appetitive power
I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And thereason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitivepower. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.
83.4 - whether free will is a separate power from the will?
I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Question 64, Article 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which areknown of themselves without any comparison. But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of theappetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, inappetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Question 79, Article 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.
OKAY - SO NOW I HAVE REVIEWED ALL THE APPETITIVE STUFF IN THIS PART... WHAT IS THE TRANSITION TO 84???????
NOw acts and habits of the soul... inasmuch as to the intellective and papetitive power, for some powers do not directly pertain to the consideration of the theologian. Now acts and habits of the appetitve part pertain to the consideration of moral science, and therefore in the second part of this work will be drawn from those, in which moral matter is to be considered. But now concerning acts and habits of the intellectrive part we'll work. First some of acts, second of habits. Now indeed in consideration of this way we proceed: for the first to be considered is how the soul understands conjoined body, second how it understands concerning the separate body.
Now the first consideration is 3fold, for first will be considered how the soul understands bodily thigs, which are below it; secondly how it understands itself, and those things which are in it; third, how it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. Concerning the cognition of bodies, three things occur for consideration - first, through what does it know; second, how nad what order, third, what it knows in them.
Okay then, so the issue is, if I were to explore the appearance and the disappearance of appetitive in tihs part - here are the issues: would I have to focus on the question of order, and will this leave me tied up in a macro-textual analysis? or is there some special point that I hope to gain thereby? Because the macro-textual case gives a functioning thing of essence, power, operation... and the First Part is "God" - which doesn't have a prologue per se but has a comparison of function with the Prima Secundae in that latter's prologue:
Because, as Damascene says, man is called made to the image of God, according to which through this image is signified intellectually and free judgment and power of oneself (per se potestativum); after it has been said of the examplar, namley of God, and of those things which proceed from the divine power according to his will; it remains that we consider his image, namely man, according as he is the priniciple of his works, as though having free will and power over his works.
Consequenter considerandum est de actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent, et ideo in secunda parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de morali materia. Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur. In consideratione vero actuum, hoc modo procedemus, primo namque considerandum est quomodo intelligit anima corpori coniuncta; secundo, quomodo intelligit a corpore separata. Prima autem consideratio erit tripartita, primo namque considerabitur quomodo anima intelligit corporalia, quae sunt infra ipsam; secundo, quomodo intelligit seipsam, et ea quae in ipsa sunt; tertio, quomodo intelligit substantias immateriales, quae sunt supra ipsam. Circa cognitionem vero corporalium, tria consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem per quid ea cognoscit; secundo, quomodo et quo ordine; tertio, quid in eis cognoscit. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum anima cognoscat corpora per intellectum. Secundo, utrum intelligat ea per essentiam suam, vel per aliquas species. Tertio, si per aliquas species, utrum species omnium intelligibilium sint ei naturaliter innatae. Quarto, utrum effluant in ipsam ab aliquibus formis immaterialibus separatis. Quinto, utrum anima nostra omnia quae intelligit, videat in rationibus aeternis. Sexto, utrum cognitionem intelligibilem acquirat a sensu. Septimo, utrum intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Octavo, utrum iudicium intellectus impediatur per impedimentum sensitivarum virtutum.
So then, what exactly are these "operations" of the intellect that deserve space... (i wonder if you could see these things as "preambles" to morality - but what hten would morality be? no - relatively considered yes, but not absolutely - because even then, see i-ii.3.4).
Question 84. How the soul while united to the body understands corporeal things beneath it
- Does the soul know bodies through the intellect?
- Does it understand them through its essence, or through any species?
- If through some species, are the species of all things intelligible naturally innate in the soul?
- Are these species derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?
- Does our soul see in the eternal ideas all that it understands?
- Does it acquire intellectual knowledge from the senses?
- Can the intellect, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
- Is the judgment of the intellect hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?
It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.
3) does it have innate knowledge?
No.
4) Are these species derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?
Plato and Avicenna both don't quite cut it.
5) whether sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands? (quotes Augustine about taking whatever is of truth as though from unjust possessors)
hen, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways.
First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in theeternal types.
Secondly, on thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these typeswe know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question thePsalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us.
But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to haveknowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonistsheld, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although thephilosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in theeternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?"
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their "eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternaltypes themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46)--viz. that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those that are holy and pure," such as the souls of the blessed.
6. whether intellectual knowledge derived from sensible things?
3 opinions - a) ancients b) Plato c) Aristotle (middle ground - agreed with Plato that intellect and sense were different but held that sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. ButAristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Platoheld; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (79, 3,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.
According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.
I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.
First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its actthrough the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge.
Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.
Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelicintellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of thehuman intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things itrises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in anindividual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universalnature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands.
8. Is the judgment of the intellect hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?
I answer that, As we have said above (Article 7), our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. (A) Now aperfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. (B) Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses";(B AND A) for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state oflife whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form aperfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.
Question 85. The mode and order of understanding
- Does our intellect understand by abstracting the species from the phantasms?
- Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
- Does our intellect naturally first understand the more universal?
- Can our intellect know many things at the same time?
- Does our intellect understand by the process of composition and division?
- Can the intellect err?
- Can one intellect understand better than another?
- Does our intellect understand the indivisible before the divisible?
Question 86. What our intellect knows in material things
- Does it know singulars?
- Does it know the infinite?
- Does it know contingent things?
- Does it know future things?
Question 87. How the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself
- Does the soul know itself by its own essence?
- Does it know its own habits?
- How does the intellect know its own act?
- How does it know the act of the will?
Question 88. How the human soul knows what is above itself
- Can the human soul in the present state of life understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?
- Can it arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?
- Is God the first object of our knowledge?
Question 89. The knowledge of the separated soul
- Can the soul separated from the body understand?
- Does it understand separate substances?
- Does it understand all natural things?
- Does it understand individuals and singulars?
- Do the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?
- Can the soul use the habit of knowledge here acquired?
- Does local distance impede the separated soul's knowledge?
- Do souls separated from the body know what happens here?
Habits
GENERAL: Habits in general (49), and their subject (50), cause (51), increase (52), decrease (53), and distinction (54).
VIRTUES: The essence (55) and subject (56) of virtues. The intellectual (57) virtues and their difference (58) with the moral virtues. The moral virtues in relation to the passions (59) and to one another (60). The cardinal (61) and theological (62)virtues. The cause (63) and mean (64) of virtue. The connection (65) of and equality (66) among the virtues. Their duration (67) after this life.
RELATED TO VIRTUES: The gifts (68), beatitudes (69) and fruits of the Holy Ghost (70).
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