Sacred Doctrine
GENERAL: The nature and extent (1) of sacred doctrine.
The One God
EXISTENCE: The existence (2) of God.
ESSENCE: We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not. So to study Him, we study what He has not -- such as composition and motion. His simplicity (3) or lack of composition. His perfection: and because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak of His goodness (6) -- and goodness in general (5) -- as well as His perfection (4). His infinity (7) and omnipresence (8). His immutability (9), and His eternity (10) following on His immutability. His unity (11). How God is known by us (12). The names of God (13).
OPERATIONS (INTELLECT): God's knowledge (14). The ideas (15), which exist in His knowledge. Truth (16) in God, for knowledge is of things that are true. Falsity (17) in God. The life of God (18), since to understand belongs to living beings.
OPERATIONS (WILL): God's will (19). In our own wills we find both the passions (such as joy and love), and the habits of the moral virtues (such as justice and fortitude). Hence we shall first consider the love (20) of God, and secondly His justice and mercy (21).
OPERATIONS (INTELLECT AND WILL): Providence (22), in respect to all created things; for in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence belongs. Predestination (23) and the book of life (24).
POWER: The power of God (25), the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. The divine beatitude (26)
God:
Existence
Essence
Operations (intellect; will; intellect and will)
Power
Trinity
Origin
"Persons"
Father
Son
Holy Spirit
Three compared
The Blessed Trinity
ORIGIN: The question of origin or procession (27). The relations of origin relations of origin (28).
THE PERSONS IN GENERAL: The signification (29) of the word "person". The number (30) of the persons, and what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like (31). Our knowledge (32) of the persons.
FATHER: The person of the Father (33).
SON: The person of the Son, to whom three names are attributed: Son (see 33), the idea of which is gathered from the idea of Father; Word (34) and Image (35).
HOLY GHOST: The person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called three things: Holy Ghost (36), Love (37) and Gift (38).
THE THREE COMPARED: The person in reference to the essence (39), with the relations or properties (40), or to the notional acts (41). The equality and likeness (42) of the persons. Their mission (43).
Creation
PRODUCTION: The first cause (44) of beings. Creation (45), which is the mode of emanation of creatures from the first cause. The beginning of the duration (46) of creatures.
DISTINCTION: The distinction of things in general(47). The distinction of good and evil: evil (48) and its cause (49). The distinction of creatures -- spiritual (or angels), corporeal, and man (which is both) -- is outlined below.
Creation
Production
Distinction
The Angels (Spirit)
SUBSTANCE: Their substance considered absolutely (50), and in relation to corporeal things, such as bodies (51) and locations (52). Their local movement (53).
INTELLECT: His power (54) and medium (55) of knowledge. The immaterial (56) and material (57) objects known. The manner (58) whereby he knows them.
WILL: The will itself (59) and its movement, which is love (60).
ORIGIN: How they were brought into natural existence (61) and perfected in grace (62). How some of them became wicked: Their sins (63) and punishment (64).
Angels
Substance
Intellect
Will
Origin
The Six Days (Matter)
CREATION: The work of creation (65).
DISTINCTION: The ordering (66) of creation towards distinction. The work of distinction in itself: The first (67), second (68) and third (69) days.
ADORNMENT: The fourth (70), fifth (71), sixth (72) and seventh (73) days.
GENERAL: All seven days (74) in common.
Matter (6 days)
Creation
Distinction
Adornment
All 7
Man (Spirit and Matter)
question 75 prologue
After the consideration of the spiritual and corporeal tcreature, man is to be considered, who is composed from spiritual and corporeal substance. And first, concnering the nature of this man; second, concerning his production. Now belongs to the theologian to consider the nature of man on the part of the soul, and not on the part of the body, unless according to the habitude which the body has to the soul. And therefore the first consideration concerning the soul will be turned. And because, according to Dionysius (XI De Ang. Hier). three things are found in spiritual substances, namely, essence, virtue nad operation, first wie will consider what pertains to the essence, secodn which pertain to the virtue or powers of it, third, those which pertai to its operation.
Concerning the first 2 things - the soul per se, second, its union to the body. concerning the first, 7 articles. question 76 - no prol. 8 articles. q. 77 - no prol - 8 art.
question 78 prologue
Concerning the powers of the soul in special
Now to be considered the powers (potentiis) fo the soul in special. Now it pertains to the consideration of the Theologian to inquire specially only about the intellective and appetitive powers (in that order he says it) in which virtues are found. But because knowleedge of these powers somehow depends on others, therefore our consideration of the powers of the soul in particular will be threefold; first to be considered concerning those things hwich are praeambula to the intellect, secondly, the intellective potentiis , third, the appetitive powers. Question 79 - 13 art. no prol. Q. 80 - no real prologue - 2 articles. 81 - no real prologue - sensuality. 3 articles (1 whether sensuality is only appetitive - 2) whether sensuality is divided into irascible and concupiscible as in diverse powers. 3 whether irascibloe and concupiscible obey reason.
q. 82 - the will - in 5 articles divided - whether will is something from necessity - whether all desire of necessity - whether it is a more eminent power than the intellect 4 - whether will moves intellect - 5 whether will is distinguihsed through the irasicble and concupiscible.
4 is interesting - whether the will moves the intellect. Aquinas there distinguishes between ways of moving - one, by way of end (the end moves the efficient). (and this way intellect move sthe will, because the understood good (bonum intellectum) is the object of the will , and moves it as the end.)
Another way someting is said to move (movere) through the mode of agent, as the changing (alterans) moves the altered, and the impellens moves the ipulsum. And this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul (et omnes animae vires, as Anselm says in the book De similitiude. Of which the reason is, becuase in all well-ordered (ordinatis) activ epowers, that power (potentia) which regards the universal end, moves the powers which regard particular ends. And this appears so much (tam) in natural things than in political (as much in natural as in political? ) For the heaven, which acts to the universal conservation of th egenerables and corruptibles, moves all inferior bodies, of which each one acts to conserve its own proper species, or even of the individual.
Also the king, who intends hte good generally of the whole kingdom, moves through his kingdom (imperium) individual (singulos) overseers of cities, who devote care to (its) direction). Now the object of the will is the good and the end in general. Now any (quaelibet potential) power is compared to some proper good convenient to itself; as sight to the perceptio of color, intellect to the cognition of the true. And therefore the will by way of agent moves all the soul's powers to its own act, besides natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our judgment (arbitrio).
First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.
Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.
obj. 1 - the mover is nobler and prior to the moved, because the moving is acting "now the agent is nobler than the patient" (Aug. XII - Sup. Gen. ad Lit0 and arist. (IIII De an.) But intellect is prior and nobler than the will, as was said (see article 3). Therefore the will doesn't move the intellect.
2) The mover is not moved (movetur) from the moved (moto), unless perhaps per accidens. But the intellect moves the will, because the appetitble apprheended through the intellect is the moving not moved, while appetite is the moving moved. Threfore intellect is not moved by the will (non movetur a voluntate).
3) We can will nothing unless it be understood. If therefore t will willing to understand moves to understnading, it will be neceesary that that willing (illud velle) precedes that understanding (aliud intelligere), and that intelligere some willing, and so on to infinity, which is imposssible. Ergo non movet.
Sed contra (Damasc - "in us is to perceive whatever we will knowledge (artem), and not to perceive". Now in us there is something through will; while we perceive artes through understanding (intellectum). Therefore the will moves the intellect.
a) The intellect can be considered two ways - 1) acc. to that the intellect is aprehnesive of being and true universalis; another way, according as it is a certain thing, and a particular power (potentia) having determinate act.
And similarly the will can be considered two ways - 1) according to the community of its oibject, prout scilicet it is apprehensive of the common good; another way, according as that is a certain determinate power of the soul having determinate act.
If therefore intellect and will be comapred according to the ratio of the community of the objects to each; so it was said above (article 3) that intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. Now if the intellect is consdiered according to the community of its object, and the will according as it is a certain determinate power, so again the intellect is higher and prior to the will, because under the ratio of being and true, which the intellect apprehends, that will is contianed, and its act, and its object. Whence the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its ibject, just as other special intellects (understood things - intellecta) - as a stone or wood (lignum? tree?) which are contained under the comon ratio or being and the ture.
If indeed the wil be considered according to the common notion fo its object, which is the good, now the intellect is second that is a certain thing and special power, so under the common rati of good it is contained, just as a certain special, and it understood, and itself to undestand, and its object, which is true, which whatever is a certain special good. And according to this will is higher htan intellect, and can move it. From this therefore the ratio appears why these powers include their acts each other, because the intellect understans the will to will, and the will wills the intellect to understand (or to understand the intellect - but doubtful). And by a similar reason the good is contained under the true (sub vero) inasmuch as it is a certain true understood, and the true is contained under the good, inasmuch as it is a certain desired good.
AD 2 ) The intellect move sthe will in another way, than the will the intellect (already said in corpus).
AD 3 - it is not necessary to proceed to infinity, but it is stood (statur) in intellect as in the first. For every movement of the will is necessary that apprehension precedes, but not every paprehension precedes the movement of hte will, but the principle of deliberation (consiliandi) and understanding (intelligendi) is some higher intellective principle than our own intellect, which is God, as Aristotle says in VII Ethics, and through this mode shows that it is not to proceed to infinity. Lib. de Bona Fortuna (Eth. Eudem. VII, xiv 21)
THIS IS VERY INTERESTING I WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE THAT......
(also check out backgroud of eudem. ethics. are they legit?) (I think it is not only to posit - to cut short infinite regress - there must be other reasons of which this is the result - maybe like that "light" for the intellect there is also a good for the will? hmmm.
art. 5 - whehter iras and conc.... READ THIS...
See I want to do someting on the will although I am not yet toally sure what it will be. The will... the will... the will... the will.... It disappears, NAdv gives an answer that it goes in the next part - they also give the answer that it is divided into powers and then into operations - but I don't know if I have found liuteral textual indications that htis is the case.
(Does the book also say - intellective - voluntas - and then the intellective and will - which is free judgment in four articles in question 83???? art. 1 the human being acts by judgment. 2. is it a power (or a habit or an act or waht? - names a certain act but also by cfommon use of speaking - denotes this principle act - as that by which a man freely judges. (reread maybe)
WHETHER IT IS AN APPETIIVE POWER - 3 -
choice - election - ccogitive virtue and appetitive -
on ethe part of the cognitive consel is required, through which judged that it be prefefered to another - on the papetitive part, it is reuqired that in appetiting that be acceptd which is judged through coumnsel...
art. IV - whether it is another power from the will.
Resp. necessary for the appetitive Powers to be proportionate to the apprehensive powers (as was said above - CHECK OUT QUESTION 64, A. 2; QU. 80, A. 2).
nOW JUST AS ON THE PART OF THE INTELLECTIVE apprehension intellect and reason have themselves, so on the part of the intellective appetite will and free choice have themselves, which is nothing other than an elective power. And this is clear from the habitude both of bjects and acts. For to understand imports a simple taking of something, whence to be intelligeted are called properl principles, which are knowin without collations through themselves.
Now to reason is properly to arrive from one to knowledge of another, whence properly we reason from conclusions, which out of principles were unknown (CHECK THIS IN ENGLISH _ THINK I MESSED UP).
Now to choose is to desire something because of following another, whence properly it is of those things which are towrads the end.
Now just as the principle holds itself to the conclusion in cognitive things, to which we assent because of hte principles, so in appetitive theings the end has itself to those which are towards the end, which on account of the deisred end. Whence it is manifest htat just as the will holds itself to the elcive power, that is to free will (liberium arbitrium). This was shown above (Q 79 a. 8). that it is of the same (eiusdem) power to understand and to reason, as the same of virtue to rest and to move. Whence also that powers is to will and to choose. And becuase o fhtis will and free will (liberium arbitrium) there are not two principles but one.
a)
MAXIME'S RIGHT - T DOES DISAPPEAR - I WONDER IF IT HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE INTELLECS ROLE IN FREE WILL - WHICH i HAVE TO READ THIS ARTICLE BETTER WHEN I AM MORE AWAKE....
BUT THEN IT IS A LITTLE JARRING - TO GO RIGHT TO HOW THE SOUL KNOWS THINGS CONJOINED TO IT WHIC ARE BELOW IT
I cold see a "teleological" approach here where it is interesting that....
you need to know things below you so that you can "choose".
84 - THERE IS A PROLOGUE
NOw acts and habits of the soul... inasmuch as to the intellective and papetitive power, for some powers do not directly pertain to the consideration of the theologian. Now acts and habits of the appetitve part pertain to the consideration of moral science, and therefore in the second part of this work will be drawn from those, in which moral matter is to be considered. But now concerning acts and habits of the intellectrive part we'll work. First some of acts, second of habits. Now indeed in consideration of this way we proceed: for the first to be considered is how the soul understands conjoined body, second how it understands from the separate body.
Now the first consideration is 3fold, for first will be considered how the soul understands bodily thigs, which are below it; secondly how it understands itself, and those things which are in it; third, how it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. Concerning the cognition of bodies, three things occur for consideration - first, through what does it know; second, how nad what order, third, what it knows in them.
HMMMMMM - can see Thomas setting this up reallybut what are the reasons that he gives?
This is not a moral thing - he has an intelligent view of hte human being?????/
IT DOES SEEM VERY TELEOLOGICAL - intelligence, will, and free wil - see if there is an indication pointing towardst he end - there is certainly somewhere - in the will - ac omparison betwen the ways things are moved - and also now in this very question itself (last article It hink ) it has someting baout choice and eligible nad choice of means.... means and ends... which woul dbe practical subsuming all this more final theoetical.....
ESSENCE: The nature of the soul in itself (75), and its union with the body (76).
POWER: The powers of the soul in general (77) Those powers which are a preamble to the intellect (78) (the powers of the soul considered generally; 2) various species of the vegattitve part 3) exterior senses 4) interior senses) - Fr Dewan only does Sense.. The intellectual (79) powers. The appetitive powers in general (80), and specifically: sensuality (81), the will (82) and free-will (83).
SO THE REASON WHY THE WILL AND FREE WILL APPEAR IN 82 and 83 IS BECAUSE HE IS THERE TREATING OF POWERS... When he comes to the Operations, he says that he will consider the will in the second part of this work.
OPERATIONS: We consider the will in the second part of this work, which deals with morals. Here we treat of the acts of the intellect. How the soul, when united to the body, understands corporeal things beneath it: Specifically, through what (84) does it know them? How (85) does it know them? What (86) does it know in them? When united to the body, how does the soul know itself (87)? When united to the body, how does it know immaterial substances (88) which are above it? And how does the soul understand when separated from the body (89)?
ORIGIN (PRODUCTION): The production of man's soul (90) and body (91), and the production of the woman (92).
ORIGIN (END): The end (93) of man's production, inasmuch as he is "the image and likeness of God".
ORIGIN (FIRST MAN): The state of Adam's soul: His intellect (94); the righteousness (95) of his will and the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over things (96). The state of Adam's body: Preservation of the individual (97) and of the species (98) through generation. The state of the offspring's body (99), virtue (100) and knowledge (101).
ORIGIN (HOME): His home, which is paradise (102).
Man
Essence
Power
Operations (notes will in 2nd part, which deals with morals)
Origin (production)
Origin (end - image and likeness)
Origin (1st guy)
Origin (1st home - paradise.)
The Government of Creatures
GENERAL: The government of things in general (103) and the specific effects (104) of this government.
GOD: How God (105) changes creatures.
SPIRITS: How an angel acts on another angel, through enlightenment (106) and speech (107); the hierarchies of good (108) and evil (109) spirits. How an angel acts on a bodily creature (110). How an angel acts on man by his natural power (111) and as a minister of God (112). The guardianship (113) of the good angels and the assaults (114) of the demons.
BODIES: How bodies change: the action (115) of the bodily creature, and fate (116), which is ascribed to certain bodies.
MAN: How man -- who is both body and spirit -- changes in general (117). The production of man from man as to the soul (118) and to the body (119).
Government
General
God
Spirits
Bodies
Man
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas
Second and Revised Edition, 1920
Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province
Online Edition Copyright © 2008 by Kevin Knight
Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.
Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.
APPROBATIO ORDINIS
Nihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.
Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis Angliæ
MARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
Copyright © 2008 by Kevin Knight. Dedicated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.
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QUESTION 75 The nature of the soul in itself
Concerning the first a twofold consideration occurs: of which the first is oncenring the soul according to itself; secondly, concerning its union to the body.
first point
1) whether the soul is a body
2) whether the human soul is something subsisting
3) whether the souls of brutes are subsisting
4) whether the soul is the human being; or the human being is more something composed from soul and body
5) whether it is composed from matter and form
6) whether hte human soul is incorruptible (question shifted to "corruptible" - more shifts than this one)
7) whether the soul is the same species as an angel. (are of one species)
QUESTION 76 - On the Union of Body and Soul
1) Whether the intellective principle is united to the body as its form
6 objections. "Necessary". a) by which something operates primo, is its form of which operation is attributed to it; just as that by which the body is primo healed (sanatur) is health, and that by which the soul knows primo, is science,; whence health is a form of the body, and science of the soul. And the reason of this is - nothing acts unless according as it is actually (*actu). Now it is manifest that the first by which the body lives is life. And since life is manifested according to diverse operations in diverse grades of living beings, that which we work (operamur) primo any one of these works of life, is the soul; for the soul is the first by which we are nouished, and we sense, and we are moved according to place; and similarly by which we first understand. Therefore this principle by which we first understand, whether it be called intellect or intellective soul, is the form of the body (Arist. demonstrates in II De An).
If someone wants to say the intellective soul is not the form of the body, it would be necessary that he find a way which that action which is "to undersatnd" be the act of this human being (etc0.
LONG - MUCH LONGER THAN I THOUGHT - THE COMMENATOR, ETC>
2) Whether the intellective principle can be multipleid numerically
according to multiplcation of bodies; or whether there is one intellect for all men.
(also 6 objections - also good size. "Impossible". (too tired to look - look later). If we took Plato's opinion - that man himself intellect (would follow that thy're one an). If we took Plato's opinion that the intellect is placed as a part or potentia of the soul which is the form of man - impossible that there be a great unmber of diverse beings of one form, just as impossible that there be one "esse" of them, for form is the principle of being.
Also impossible how one places the union of the intellect to this and to that man - etc.
3) Whether in the body of which form is the intellective principle, there is any other soul.
Plato posited diverse souls to be in one body also according to distinct organs to which he attributed divrse works of life. Aristotle reprobates this opinion (De Anima)
4) Whether there be in it some other substantial form.
5) Of what sort of body ought there to be an intellective pirnicple is the form. (whether the intellective soul is comveneiently united to such a body)
6) Whether such a body is united by any other mediating body.
7) Whether any accident is mediating
8) Whether the soul be whole in every (qualibet) part of the body.
QUESTION 77 - CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH PERTAIN TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL.
a) in general
b) in special.
Concerning a - 8 articles.
1) whether the essence of the soul be in its power (potentia)
7 objections!! (impossible)
2) whether one only power of the osul, or many
3) how the powers of the soul are distinguished.
4) the order of these to each other.
5) whether the soul is the subject of all powers.
6) whether powers flow (fluant) from the essence of the soul.
7) whether one power arises from another.
8) whether all powers fo the soul remain in it after death.
QUESTION 78 CONCERNING THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR (SPECIALI)
4 articles.
Now the powers of the soul must be considered in particular. Now to this consideration it pertains to THEOLGOI to inquire specially alone concerning the intellective and appetitive powers, in whcih the virtues are found. But because cognition of these powers somehow depends on each other (ex aliis), theroefore our consideration of the powers fo the soul in particular will be 3parted; 1) considering those which are paeambula to intellectum; secondly concerning the intellective powers, third concerning the appetive powers.
Concerning the first, there are four.
1) the genera of powers of the soul.
2) the species of the vegetative parts (whether suitable - nutritive, augmentative, generative)
3) exterior senses
4) interior senses.
QUESTION 79 - THE INTELLECTIVE POWERS
13 items
1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence
2) If it is a power, whether it is a passive power (potentia).
3) If it is a passive power, whether it is to place some agent intellect.
4) whether it is someting of the soul.
5) whether the agnet intellect is one of all.
6) Whether memory is in intellect.
7) Whether there are other powers from intellect. (Whether some poiwer is intellective memory and another intellect)
8) Whether a ratio be some powers from intellect.
9) Whether the higher and lower reason are diverse powers.
10) Whether intelligence is another power besides intellect.
11) Whether the speculative and practical intellects are diverse powers.
12) Whether synderesis is a power (potentia) of the intellective part. (a certain special power distinct from the others)
13) Whether conscience is some power of the intellective part.
Question 80
1) Whether the appetite be some special power of the osul.
2) Whether the Sensitive and Intellecitve appetite be diverse powers.
QUESTION 81
On Sensuality
3 things to be sought
1) Whether sensuality is an appetitive power only
2) Whether sensuality is divided into irascible nad concupiscible as in diverse powers.
3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible obey reason.
(just off the top of my head - fits in with the whole pattern of working from the powers of the soul, and the 3rd has to do with the interinvolvement - hmmmm... no maybe not - maybe not the ACTS Of reason influencing, but the fact that we have powers of reasoning.... something like hwat Dewan was saying but chekc what he was saying and then see.)
Question 82
THE WILL
1) Whether the will desires anything out of necessity.
2) Whether it desires ALL out of necessity.
3) Whether it is a more eminent power than the intellect
4) Whether the will is distinguished through irascible and concupiscible....
Question 83.
Concerning Free Judgment (Arbitrio)
1) Whether man be of free judgment
2) what is free judgment, whether a power, or an act, or a habit
3) if it is a power (potentia) whether it is appetitive or cognitive
4) if it is appetitive, whether it is the same poweras the will, or another.
QUESTION 84
How (quomodo) the conjoined soul knows corporeal things which are below itself.
1) whether the soul knows bodies through intellect (per intellectum)
2) whether it understands them through its essence, or through some species.
3) If through some species, whether the species fo all intelligbles be naturally innate to it.
4) whether they flow to it from other separated immaterial forms.
5) whether our soul sees everything which it undersatnds in rationibus aeternis.
6) Whether it acquires intelligible cognition from sense.
7) Whether intellect can actually understand through intelligible species which penes has itself, not turning itself ot the phantasms.
8) Whether the judgment of the intellect (intellectus) is impeded through the impediment of the sensitive powers.
Question 85 - The mode and order of understnading (intelligendi)
1) whether our intellect understands by abstracting species from phantasms.
2) whether the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms has itself to our intellect as what is understood, or as that by which it is understood.
3) Whether our intellect naturally intelligts the more universal first.
4) Whether our intellect can understand much (multa) at the same time.
5) Whether our intellect undersatnds by composing and dividing.
6) Whether our intellect can err.
7) Whether it can be better to undersatnd one thing mor ethan another.
8) Whether our intellect knowls indivisible prior to the divisible.
Question 86
What Our Intellect Knows in Materials
1) Whether it knows singulars
2) whether it knows the infinite (infinita)
3) whether it knows contingent things
4) whether it knows the future.s
Question 87
1) Whether the Intellecitve Soul Knows itself through its Essence
2) How it knows habits existing in itself.
3) how the intellect knows its own act
4) How it knows the act of the will
Question 88
How the Human Soul Knows things which are ABove it
1) whether the hnuman soul according to the state of present life can understand immaterial substances which angels, we say throuhg themslves.
2) Whehter it can arrive at notice of these through cognition of material things
3) whether God be that which is known by us first.
Question 89
On the Knowledge o fhte Separate Soul
1) Whether hte soul separated from the body can intellect
2) Whehter it intellects separate substances
3) Whether it intellects all natural things
4) Whether it knows singulars
5) Whether the habit of science of acuired here (hic) remains in teh separated soul
6) Whether it can use the habit of science in the present circumstnaces (hic) acquired. (later version: "whether the act of science acquired here remains in the separated soul")
7) Whehter local distance impedes the knowledge of hte seaprated soul.
8) Whether the soul separated from the body knows those things which are done in the present circumstnaces (here - hic).
PROLOGUE TO THE WHOLE SUMMA
Quia Catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud apostoli I ad Corinth. III, tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non escam; propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium. Consideravimus namque huius doctrinae novitios, in his quae a diversis conscripta sunt, plurimum impediri, partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum; partim etiam quia ea quae sunt necessaria talibus ad sciendum, non traduntur secundum ordinem disciplinae, sed secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio, vel secundum quod se praebebat occasio disputandi; partim quidem quia eorundem frequens repetitio et fastidium et confusionem generabat in animis auditorum. Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi evitare studentes, tentabimus, cum confidentia divini auxilii, ea quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinent, breviter ac dilucide prosequi, secundum quod materia patietur.
PROLOGUE TO THE PRIMA SECUNDAE
Because, as Damascene says, man is called made to the image of God, according to which through this image is signified intellectually and free judgment and power of oneself (per se potestativum); after it has been said of the examplar, namley of God, and of those things which proceed from the divine power according to his will; it remains that we consider his image, namely man, according as he is the priniciple of his works, as though having free will and power over his works.
[33404] Iª-IIae pr.
Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur, secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.
PRLOGUE TO THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE
SECUNDA PARS SECUNDAE PARTIS
PROOEMIUM
[38736] IIª-IIae pr.
Post communem considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis et aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus, necesse est considerare singula in speciali, sermones enim morales universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt. Potest autem aliquid in speciali considerari circa moralia dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius materiae moralis, puta cum consideratur de hac virtute vel hoc vitio; alio modo, quantum ad speciales status hominum, puta cum consideratur de subditis et praelatis, de activis et contemplativis, vel quibuscumque aliis differentiis hominum. Primo ergo considerabimus specialiter de his quae pertinent ad omnes hominum status; secundo vero, specialiter de his quae pertinent ad determinatos status. Est autem considerandum circa primum quod, si seorsum determinaremus de virtutibus, donis, vitiis et praeceptis, oporteret idem multoties dicere, qui enim sufficienter vult tractare de hoc praecepto, non moechaberis, necesse habet inquirere de adulterio, quod est quoddam peccatum, cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis. Erit igitur compendiosior et expeditior considerationis via si simul sub eodem tractatu consideratio procedit de virtute et dono sibi correspondente, et vitiis oppositis, et praeceptis affirmativis vel negativis. Erit autem hic considerationis modus conveniens ipsis vitiis secundum propriam speciem, ostensum est enim supra quod vitia et peccata diversificantur specie secundum materiam vel obiectum, non autem secundum alias differentias peccatorum, puta cordis, oris et operis, vel secundum infirmitatem, ignorantiam et malitiam, et alias huiusmodi differentias; est autem eadem materia circa quam et virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt. Sic igitur tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta, omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendae ad septem, quarum tres sunt theologicae, de quibus primo est agendum; aliae vero quatuor sunt cardinales, de quibus posterius agetur. Virtutum autem intellectualium una quidem est prudentia, quae inter cardinales virtutes continetur et numeratur; ars vero non pertinet ad moralem, quae circa agibilia versatur, cum ars sit recta ratio factibilium, ut supra dictum est; aliae vero tres intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, intellectus et scientia, communicant etiam in nomine cum donis quibusdam spiritus sancti, unde simul etiam de eis considerabitur in consideratione donorum virtutibus correspondentium. Aliae vero virtutes morales omnes aliqualiter reducuntur ad virtutes cardinales, ut ex supradictis patet, unde in consideratione alicuius virtutis cardinalis considerabuntur etiam omnes virtutes ad eam qualitercumque pertinentes et vitia opposita. Et sic nihil moralium erit praetermissum.
PROLOGUE TO THE TERTIA PARS
TERTIA PARS
PROOEMIUM
[46731] IIIª pr.
Quia salvator noster dominus Iesus Christus, teste Angelo, populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum, viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus, necesse est ut, ad consummationem totius theologici negotii, post considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae et virtutum ac vitiorum, de ipso omnium salvatore ac beneficiis eius humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur. Circa quam, primo considerandum occurrit de ipso salvatore; secundo, de sacramentis eius, quibus salutem consequimur; tertio, de fine immortalis vitae, ad quem per ipsum resurgendo pervenimus. Circa primum duplex consideratio occurrit, prima est de ipso incarnationis mysterio, secundum quod Deus pro nostra salute factus est homo; secunda de his quae per ipsum salvatorem nostrum, idest Deum incarnatum, sunt acta et passa.
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