OPERATIONS (INTELLECT): God's knowledge (14). The ideas (15), which exist in His knowledge. Truth (16) in God, for knowledge is of things that are true. Falsity (17) in God. The life of God (18), since to understand belongs to living beings.

OPERATIONS (WILL): God's will (19). In our own wills we find both the passions (such as joy and love), and the habits of the moral virtues (such as justice and fortitude). Hence we shall first consider the love (20) of God, and secondly His justice and mercy (21).
OPERATIONS (INTELLECT AND WILL): Providence (22), in respect to all created things; for in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence belongs. Predestination (23) and the book of life (24).

14 - God's knowledge:

Question 14. God's knowledge

so with God, appears its acts, objects, comparing with us - then into ideas, truth, and falsity, and his "life". Keep in mind close relations with will.... to be treated after this.

Question 15. Ideas

Question 16. Truth

Question 17. Falsity

Question 18. The life of God

Relevent Prooemiums

QUAESTIO 14

PROOEMIUM

[28893] Iª q. 14 pr.Post considerationem eorum quae ad divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae manet in operante, quaedam vero quae procedit in exteriorem effectum, primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in intelligente est, et velle in volente); et postmodum de potentia Dei, quae consideratur ut principium operationis divinae in effectum exteriorem procedentis. (Basis of the distinction) Quia vero intelligere quoddam vivere est, post considerationem divinae scientiae, considerandum erit de vita divina. Et quia scientia verorum est, erit etiam considerandum de veritate et falsitate. Rursum, quia omne cognitum in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit etiam adiungenda consideratio de ideis. Circa scientiam vero quaeruntur sexdecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit scientia. Secundo, utrum Deus intelligat seipsum. Tertio, utrum comprehendat se. Quarto, utrum suum intelligere sit sua substantia. Quinto, utrum intelligat alia a se. Sexto, utrum habeat de eis propriam cognitionem. Septimo, utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva. Octavo, utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum. Nono, utrum scientia Dei sit eorum quae non sunt. Decimo, utrum sit malorum. Undecimo, utrum sit singularium. Duodecimo, utrum sit infinitorum. Decimotertio, utrum sit contingentium futurorum. Decimoquarto, utrum sit enuntiabilium. Decimoquinto, utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis. Decimosexto, utrum Deus de rebus habeat speculativam scientiam vel practicam.

QUAESTIO 15

PROOEMIUM

[29019] Iª q. 15 pr.Post considerationem de scientia Dei, restat considerare de ideis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, an sint ideae. Secundo, utrum sint plures, vel una tantum. Tertio, utrum sint omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo.

QUAESTIO 16

PROOEMIUM

[29048] Iª q. 16 pr.Quoniam autem scientia verorum est, post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est. Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens. Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus. Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate ipsius.

QUAESTIO 17

PROOEMIUM

[29112] Iª q. 17 pr.Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus. Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu. Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.

QUAESTIO 18

PROOEMIUM

[29144] Iª q. 18 pr.Quoniam autem intelligere viventium est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino, considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.

************

Several things to note right off the bat. Very interesting order - note that question 14 is the only one that has a detailed discussion about "knowledge" - then you're right off to ideas, then to truth and falsity (there is a progression from ideas/ forms to truth and falsity I think perhaps - at any rate this is all definitely headed towards providence - I remember he said it was I think "stultissima" to think God was ignorant of what went on... knowing himself, non discursive, cause of things... then you get into "ideas" and "truth and falsity" which seem to be "in general" rather than in God (which is telling perhaps about God, or about the way we know or discuss) - but God is at the heart of it as you see whether in the isolatedly explicit question or in details (e.g. in 15 you see ad 3 of art. 1 Reply to Objection 3. God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with Hisessence. and you see at the last response in the last article that he's getting ready to show that God's providence extends to individuals... and then in Truth you get the innocent question in the midst of asking what truth is (art. 5) - is God truth? probably in more spots as well.... Faslity is quite interesting - God is mentioned only 7 times in 4 articles). Falsity is a good expose but too complex to sum up with the speed I need.

________________________________________________________________________
Now human being....

POWER: The powers of the soul in general (77) Those powers which are a preamble to the intellect (78). The intellectual (79)powers. The appetitive powers in general (80), and specifically: sensuality (81), the will (82) and free-will (83).
OPERATIONS: We consider the will in the second part of this work, which deals with morals. Here we treat of the acts of the intellect. How the soul, when united to the body, understands corporeal things beneath it: Specifically, through what (84) does it know them? How (85) does it know them? What (86) does it know in them? When united to the body, how does the soul know itself (87)? When united to the body, how does it know immaterial substances (88) which are above it? And how does the soul understand when separated from the body (89)?

Question 77. The powers of the soul in general

Question 78. The specific powers of the soul

Question 79. The intellectual powers

Question 80. The appetitive powers in general

Ok, these are also very interesting. First thing to note in comparison with God is that God he doesn't have to talk about powers, how things work (this is becuase he already spoke of the essence of God which such things as lack of composition, simplicity, etc. we're just looking at God from the aspect of the way that we think (this is memorably evident in the prologue to 19 where he says "as in our appetitive powers are found X, Y z - so we'll talk about God that way - see other post about how we know God in this blog.)

What you have with human beings is a careful explication of power - it cannot be identical with the essence for urgent reasons. Then you have the powers which must be understood in order to undersatnd the intellective and the appetitive... (78)

Then in one question - 79 only - you have the intellectual powers... the articles make sure the intellect is a power rather than its essence, then it asks if it's a passive power (broad sense of PATI - OH here it is the SECOND question - this is TELLING - ITS SOMETHING THAT RECEIVES ITS PERFECTION!!! than art. 3 - says there must be an active intellect - SC from aristotle: On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect. This is specifically an Aristotelian problem - Plato had forms existing apart from matter - for Aristotle:

But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing inmatter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actualby what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.

FORMS EXISTING IN MATTER ARE NOT ACTUALLY INTELLIGIBLE - very interesting ontologically speaking!!!!! This is why it has to be "make" instead of "take" - SPECIES - likeness - what did Dewan say? Likeness - proportionality between the reciever and what is recieved... a thing receives according to its mode of being and the soul can "in a way" become all things...

Article 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?

Short answer: must be something outside to help it - the human intellect is derived.

Long answer: In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes frompotentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Some put this outside thing to be the active intellect

but Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect (76, 1). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action (WHATEVER IT IS THAT IS THE ACTIVE INTELLECT!!!!! - an activity - it is NOT considering - WHY LIGHT as immediately follows? Wouldn't it be as receives the light? but it is actually shining on this instead of that - we do this SEPARATELY - considering is more like thinking - more sensitive - to me this sounds like you're turning your gaze on something which makes it become an object of intellection - i mean this in the way that they mean light and not as though looking at it by different angles..) must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is GodHimself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (90, 3; I-II, 3, 7). Wherefore the human soulderives its intellectual light from Him, according to Psalm 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

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Reply to Objection 3. If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellectis that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the gooddisposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.

Reply to Objection 4. The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species.

On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

Reply to Objection 5. Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

art. 5 - whether it is one for all? art. 6 whether memory is in the intellectual part (interesting - staying principle - not there for Avicenna - Aquinas clearly worked it out - not only from potentiality of Aristotle but also from the nature of hte intellect - stable kind of thing)

But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it inpotentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding--namely, in the sense that whoever hashabitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.

The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporealmatter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to actthrough them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.

Article 7. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?

no. belongs to nature of passive power to retain as well as receive.

Article 8. Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect? no.For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfectknowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and withoutmental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in manreason and intellect are the same power.

Article 10. Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect? no. in act.

Article 11. Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers? no. "accidental" to a thing apprehended by the intellect whether it be directed to consideration of truth or to operation.

Article 12. Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others? no. habit. first practical principles.

Article 13. Whether conscience be a power? no. an act. though we give the name of "conscience" to synderesis however.

SO THIS REALLY IS IT. Apart from the Preambles (which make the knowing power seem important - (but I think also willing - check the premable) also the preamble... it would also be interesting to compare with what he DOES do with the will... already here we have four questions on appetitive powers - The appetitive powers in general (80), and specifically: sensuality (81), the will (82) and free-will (83). - and then he withholds and then moves to operation....

So why does he do that? Why does he put the appetitive in here AT ALL??? yes it seems tidy and self-explanatory at first - from that preamble - there's apprehensive and appetitive - we'll deal with the powers and then with the operations... but why are they separated like that? moral and one's a principle?

I think the key lies in the preamble to the Prima Secundae: Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii. 12), man is said to be made to God's image, in so far as the image implies anintelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e., God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e., man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.

OUTLINE OF PRIMA SECUNDAE:

Man's last end (5 questions - what is it, happiness, required, attainment);

Human acts: 16 questions (voluntary, invol. circ; obj; mover; manner of movement; enjoyment; intention; choice (RING A BELL?); consent; use; acts commanded; GOOD AND EVIL in general; interior acts; external actions; consequences (b/c good or bad)

Passions: 27 questions (subject, differences, goodness & malice, relations; conc plus individ; irascible plus individ I know enoguh to simplify

Habits: 22 questions: (general; subject, cause; increase; decrease; distinction. virtues under habits: essence; subject; intell.; dif w/ moral; moral virtues in rel to pssns; each other; cardinal; theol; cause; mean (of virtue); connection; equality; duration after life; also Gifts; Beatitudes; Fruits of HS.

VICE AND SIN: 19 quest: in themselves; distinction; comparison; subject; cause; internal - ignorance; passion; malice. External - devil; man. Original sense - essence; subject. Other sins causing. Effects - corruption of nature; stain; debt; venial and mortal sin; venial sin.

LAW 19 questions: essence; kinds; effects; eternal law; natural law; human law; its power; its mutability; old law; its precepts; moral; cermenoial; judicial; causes; duration; reason for juicial precepts. New law - law of Gospel; comparison with old; what it contains.

GRACE: 6 questions: necessity; essence; division; causes; effects; merit.

COMPARE W/ PROLOGUE TO Q. 75

QUAESTIO 75

PROOEMIUM

[31447] Iª q. 75 pr.Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Et primo, de natura ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione. Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur. Et quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius. Circa primum duplex occurrit consideratio, quarum prima est de ipsa anima secundum se; secunda, de unione eius ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur septem. Primo, utrum anima sit corpus. Secundo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens. Tertio, utrum animae brutorum sint subsistentes. Quarto, utrum anima sit homo; vel magis homo sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Quinto, utrum sit composita ex materia et forma. Sexto, utrum anima humana sit incorruptibilis. Septimo, utrum anima sit eiusdem speciei cum Angelo.

COMPARISON WITH THE SECUNDA SECUNDAE

FAITH: 16 q. act; esp outward act; virtue; those who have it; cause; effects. Gifts - corresponding - understanding; knowledge. (NOTE WHERE COGNITIVE PLAYS). Vices- unbelief general; heresy; apostasy; blasphemy generally; against HS; VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING - q. 15; precepts (there are precepts?)
HOPE: 6 questions: hope itself; subject; gift-fear; opposing vices desapir; presumption; precepts (again?)
CHARITY: 24 questions: in itself; its subject; object; order. Its acts - principal to love; interior acts - joy; peace; mercy. Exterior - beneficence; almsdeeds; fraternal correction. Vices - hatred; sloth; envy; discord, contention; scism; war; striife; sedition; scandal (names which each are opposed to) precepts; gift - wisdom; folly - opposed to wisdom.
PRUDENCE: 10 questions (confusing b/c name same ones) virtue; parts; quasi-integral; subjective (ruling oneself or others - 47 and 50 rspctvly); quasi-potential parts (rel. virtues); gift - counsel; vices - imprudence; negligence; false resemblance; precepts.
JUSTICE - THIS IS BIG - 56 QUESTIONS!!!!
Right; justice; injustice; judgment. Commutative and distributive; restitution. Vice - (distributive) respect of persons (involuntary commutations) injury of neighbour by deed: murder; bodily injury; theft and robbery or by WORD. Verbal injuries in JUDICIAL by judge; accuser; defendant; witnesses; defending attorney (interesting!) Others (outside judicial): reviling; backbiting; tale-bearing; derision; cursing. Vices - voluntary (YES READ VOLUNTARY) commutaions - cheating; usury (none other special ones from rapine and theft). PARTS - do good and avoid evil and vices; CNNCTD VIRTUES in general; CNCTD VIRTUES - RELIGION in itself; acts - devotion; and prayer; 2ndary external - bodily reverence. Offering things - sacrifices; oblations and 1st fruits; tithes; vows. TAKING FROM GOD - Sacraments (3rd part) taking his Name - adjuration; prayer; praise; confirm assertion. VICE - superstition - idolatry; divinations; observances; undue worship to true God. VICE IRRELIGION - deficiency where other excess - deficincy - temptation of God; perjury; sacrilege; simony. CNCTD VRTS - piety and opp. vices.
CNCTD VIRTUES - OBSERVANCE - bservance itself; dulia; obedience; disobedience; gratitude; ingratitude; vengeance; truth; lying; dissumlation and hypocrisy; boasting; irony; friendliness or affability; flattery; quarreling; libearlity; covetousness; prodigality; epikeia; piety; precepts.

FORTITUDE: 18 - virtue; martyrdom (principal act) - Vices - fear; fearlessness; daring - Parts - genearl; magnanimity; presumption; ambition; vainglory; pusillanimity; magnificence; opposed vices; patience and opposed
vices; perseverance; opposed vices. Gift of HS; precepts.

TEMPERANCE - 30 questions: Virtue; vices; parts in general; shamefacedness; honesty; abstinence; its act of fasting; gluttony; sobriety; drunkenness; chastity; virginity (its part);
lust; parts of lust. Contenience; incontenience; clemency and meekness; anger; (opposed to meekness); cruelty; modesty; humility; pride; adams sin of pride' its punishments; its temptation. Studiousness; curiosity; modesty in words or deeds; in outward attire. Precepts.

ACTS WHICH PERTAIN TO CERTAIN MEN: 19 questions (basing on gifts - knowledge; speech, miracles) Prophecy; cause; mode; division; rapture. Tongues; words. Miracles. Diversities of life - division into active and contemplative; contemplative; active; comparing the two.
States of life - various duties and states in general; state of perfection in general; episcopal state; religious state requirements; its proper realm; variations; entrance into religious life.

So anything related to knowledge will be 1) under faith; 2) under charity (wisdom); 3) inasmuch as "studiosity" touches upon it, under temperance; 4) Certain men whether under gifts (prophecy, words); or under states of life (contemplative - and cont w/ active). OH FORGOT PRIMA SECUNDAE ENTIRELY - under "habits" "virtues" and also "law" inasmuch as law a principle - (and also maybe under grace, effects of sin, other stuff)...

So all this is to say that - in my little comparison of affective parts to apprehensive parts, I find a lot of affective - justice is probably the biggest treatise and as he writes in talking about God - in the human being - virtues associated with the will are justice...

But now that I've done that - noted that we have "powers" of intellect in 1 question (79) followed by 4 (although some quite short) questions on appetitive powers - I have not yet looked at the operations - which I will do now!!!!

OPERATIONS: We consider the will in the second part of this work, which deals with morals. Here we treat of the acts of the intellect. How the soul, when united to the body, understands corporeal things beneath it: Specifically, through what (84) does it know them? How (85) does it know them? What (86) does it know in them? When united to the body, how does the soul know itself (87)? When united to the body, how does it know immaterial substances (88) which are above it? And how does the soul understand when separated from the body (89)?

HERE ARE THE INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS I TRANSLATED
QUESTION 84
How (quomodo) the conjoined soul knows corporeal things which are below itself.
1) whether the soul knows bodies through intellect (per intellectum)
2) whether it understands them through its essence, or through some species.
3) If through some species, whether the species fo all intelligbles be naturally innate to it.
4) whether they flow to it from other separated immaterial forms.
5) whether our soul sees everything which it undersatnds in rationibus aeternis.
6) Whether it acquires intelligible cognition from sense.
7) Whether intellect can actually understand through intelligible species which penes has itself, not turning itself ot the phantasms.
8) Whether the judgment of the intellect (intellectus) is impeded through the impediment of the sensitive powers.

Question 85 - The mode and order of understnading (intelligendi)
1) whether our intellect understands by abstracting species from phantasms.
2) whether the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms has itself to our intellect as what is understood, or as that by which it is understood.
3) Whether our intellect naturally intelligts the more universal first.
4) Whether our intellect can understand much (multa) at the same time.
5) Whether our intellect undersatnds by composing and dividing.
6) Whether our intellect can err.
7) Whether it can be better to undersatnd one thing more than another.
8) Whether our intellect knowls indivisible prior to the divisible.
In relation to God's knowledge - I would say this has a lot to do with what God DOESN't have to do - is it discursive? no.
THESE are the questions I should really look into - compare - consider.... 1. Is there knowledge in God? 2 Does God understand Himself? 3 Does He comprehend Himself? 4 Is His understanding His substance? 5 Does He understand other things besides Himself? 6 Does He have a proper knowledge of them? 7 Is the knowledge of God discursive?

Question 86
What Our Intellect Knows in Materials
1) Whether it knows singulars
2) whether it knows the infinite (infinita)
3) whether it knows contingent things
4) whether it knows the future.s

8. Is the knowledge of God the cause of things? 9. Does God have knowledge of non-existing things? 10. Does he have knowledge of evil? 11. Does he have knowledge of individual things? 12. Does he know the infinite? 13. Does he know future contingent things? 14. Does he know enunciable things? 15. Is the knowledge of God variable? 16. Does God have speculative or practical knowledge of things?

Question 87
1) Whether the Intellecitve Soul Knows itself through its Essence
2) How it knows habits existing in itself.
3) how the intellect knows its own act
4) How it knows the act of the will

Note the REVERSAL of the way things are going - for God you start with God knowing himself, etc. etc. and then to knowledge of things (as maker) the human being is also a maker but the relation is different of course -
8. Is the knowledge of God the cause of things? 9. Does God have knowledge of non-existing things? 10. Does he have knowledge of evil? 11. Does he have knowledge of individual things? 12. Does he know the infinite? 13. Does he know future contingent things? 14. Does he know enunciable things? 15. Is the knowledge of God variable? 16. Does God have speculative or practical knowledge of things?

Question 88
How the Human Soul Knows things which are ABove it
1) whether the hnuman soul according to the state of present life can understand immaterial substances which angels, we say throuhg themslves.
2) Whehter it can arrive at notice of these through cognition of material things
3) whether God be that which is known by us first.

the last question - ppl have said this - aquinas put first - order of being instead order of knowability to us - but when he talks about how we know he definitely does order of knowability to us.

Question 89
On the Knowledge o fhte Separate Soul
1) Whether hte soul separated from the body can intellect
2) Whehter it intellects separate substances
3) Whether it intellects all natural things
4) Whether it knows singulars
5) Whether the habit of science of acuired here (hic) remains in teh separated soul
6) Whether it can use the habit of science in the present circumstnaces (hic) acquired. (later version: "whether the act of science acquired here remains in the separated soul")
7) Whehter local distance impedes the knowledge of hte seaprated soul.
8) Whether the soul separated from the body knows those things which are done in the present circumstnaces (here - hic).
I think this is the safest time I may actually say "I don't think I need to focus on this last one for my project.

Knowledge and Aquinas

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Specific comparison - God and human being - KNOWLEDGE

Question 14. God's knowledge

so with God, appears its acts, objects, comparing with us - then into ideas, truth, and falsity, and his "life". Keep in mind close relations with will.... to be treated after this.

Question 15. Ideas

Question 16. Truth

Question 17. Falsity

Question 18. The life of God

Question 77. The powers of the soul in general

Question 78. The specific powers of the soul

Question 79. The intellectual powers

Question 80. The appetitive powers in general

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